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There is presently considerable debate about the application and interpretation of realism in
economics. Interest in this area of the philosophy and methodology of economics has intensi￿ed
over the last twenty years, especially due to the substantial contributions by Uskali M￿ki and
Tony Lawson respectively. Although their work falls under the same banner of realism in
economics, their projects di⁄er signi￿cantly in many important respects. This review tries
to clarify the contrasting approaches of each author and explains the main reasons for the
di⁄erences between them. The emphasis is on clari￿cation of their respective positions rather
than a comprehensive critical evaluation as such.
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It is probably no exaggeration to say that by the 1990s the debates that had dominated the
methodology of economics were beginning to ￿ ag. Diminishing returns had set in to the further
allocation of intellectual resources to arguments about the applicability of the ideas of Popper,
Lakatos and Kuhn to economics (with logical positivism the ritual whipping boy in such debates).
The philosophy of economics sought a fresh approach, as suggested by the title of Backhouse￿ s
(1994) book New Directions in Economic Methodology. The philosophy of scienti￿c realism is one
such approach and the aim of this paper is to compare and contrast the positions of two of the
main exponents of realism in economics, Uskali M￿ki and Tony Lawson. Although they share some
basic notions of realism, their approach and contributions to the realist project in economics di⁄er
fundamentally. Indeed they may be regarded as advancing two di⁄erent if overlapping projects.
The aim here is not a comprehensive critical evaluation as such, but primarily to clarify their inter-
pretation and use of realist philosophy in economics. Although there are some explicit and implied
criticisms in the text, close attention is paid to the work of the authors themselves rather than to
what various critics have had to say about it. Needless to say, given the extensive publications by
the two authors in this area, this review is necessarily selective in describing the main ideas and
arguments in each case and the basic di⁄erences between them.
An indication of the growing in￿ uence of realism in the philosophy of economics is the increasing
number of publications in this area. However, the realist project in economics has found more fertile
soil in Europe than America, especially Lawson￿ s realist critique of mainstream economic theory.
Not surprisingly, given a tradition of thought critical of essential aspects of classical and neoclassical
economics (to which Keynes and Kaldor are most often referred to in this regard), under Lawson￿ s
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1in￿ uence the University of Cambridge has become the main sponsor of research in this area. The
Cambridge Workshop on Realism and Economics has been running for more than ￿fteen years
since it was established in 1990. Lawson￿ s in￿ uence is also detectable in the Cambridge Journal of
Economics where the Editors explicitly favour contributions with, ￿a strong emphasis on realism
of analysis￿ .
M￿ki has been more neutral in his approach and less critical of the actual content or substance
of particular economic theories. This may re￿ ect the fact that M￿ki is a philosopher (since August
2006 in the Department of Social and Moral Philosophy at the University of Helsinki and for about
ten years previously in the Department of Philosophy at Erasmus University in Rotterdam) with a
strong interest in economics, rather than an economist with an interest in philosophy. M￿ki￿ s work
is unusual in that besides its application to economics it has also been used to extend and re￿ne
the concept of realism in the hands of philosophers (see, for example, M￿ki 1996). Economics is
accustomed to hand-me-down philosophy of science and methodology based on the natural sciences,
especially physics. Having economics provide case studies for lessons in the philosophy of science is
thus a notable and refreshing exception to the rule.
Although there is a substantial and growing body of research and responses to the ideas put
forward by Lawson and M￿ki, there has been little in the way of a sustained direct comparison
thereof. An important exception may be found in the book by Boylan and O￿ Gorman (1995).
However, Boylan and O￿ Gorman￿ s commentary is conducted within the broader context of ￿nding
a compromise between relativism and realism towards, as suggested by the subtitle of their book,
￿a reformulation of economic methodology￿ . There is also a short description and explanation of
Lawson￿ s and M￿ki￿ s positions in Wade Hands￿book, Re￿ection without Rules (see Hands 2001A).
Where methodologists have commented on the realist project in economics, their arguments have at
times (allegedly) misconceived the philosophical positions taken in this regard. For example, in his
reply to a paper by Hausman (1998) critical of the realist project in economics, M￿ki claims that,
￿his arguments mis￿re because they are based on misunderstandings about the nature of realism
as I use the term. (I leave it to others, including Lawson, to defend themselves)￿(M￿ki 2000: 109).
Thus there appears to be room for a paper that tries to clarify the application of philosophical
realism to economics by concentrating on the di⁄erent approaches taken by M￿ki and Lawson.
Section 1 brie￿ y outlines the realist philosophy of science, demarcating it from other philosoph-
ical perspectives. Sections 2 and 3 examine the distinct ways in which realism has been applied
to economics by M￿ki and Lawson respectively. Section 4 concludes by drawing on the previous
sections in comparing the similarities and di⁄erences of the two realist projects in economics.
1 Scienti￿c realism
In describing the state of progress and new directions in economic methodology, Wade Hands notes
in one of his thirteen theses that debates on realism in economics have become ￿a many splendoured
thing￿ . The more recent work on realism in the methodology of economics has moved on from the
time when such debates were derivative of the arguments between instrumentalists and scienti￿c
realists in the philosophy of the natural sciences: ￿Those writing on economic methodology have
cut the philosophical umbilical cord to the Received View and the many di⁄erent faces of ￿ realism￿
are now emerging within the methodological literature￿(Hands 2001B: 53).
One reason for confusion regarding the term ￿ realism￿in economics is that it has not one but
many meanings, depending on the context in which the term is being used. As pointed out by
M￿ki (1998), ￿￿ Realism￿is used as the name for a variety of doctrines about things such as science,
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possibilities and so on￿ . M￿ki notes that this diversity is re￿ ected in the fact that opponents of
realism come in various guises. Non-realists include, for example, those subscribing to idealism,
phenomenalism, empiricism, instrumentalism, ￿ctionalism, constructivism and relativism. In this
paper the main concern is with scienti￿c realism: to what extent are theories (including economic
theories) and the way theorists (including economists) think about them consistent with (di⁄erent
versions of) a realist interpretation? And, if not, is this a good or bad thing for the way we think
about and do economics?
Boylan and O￿Gorman (1995: 89 - 93) list four stereotypes of scienti￿c realism thought to be
broadly acceptable to those who regard themselves as scienti￿c realists. (1) The minimum criterion
is that the statements of a theory are (or may be) either true or false (contrary to instrumentalism).
(2) Furthermore, the statements have to be true or false apart from ourselves, that is that although
a theorist creates such statements their truth or falsehood is independent of the mind that created
them (contrary to relativism). (3) At the ontological level, this can be taken to mean the view
that the world exists independently of us, that the world really is this way rather than that, and
what we think or feel about it makes no di⁄erence (contrary to constructivism). (4) Moreover, it
is possible to know what the independently existing objects and their properties in the world truly
are (contrary to Kantian idealism). Thus in principle there is no impenetrable veil between such
objects, even if they are not directly observable, and their access to the human mind. It is the task
of science and the role of theory to discover more precisely what the objects and their essential
properties are.
These stereotypes characterize scienti￿c realism at the basic levels of semantics (truth or false-
hood), ontology (existence) and epistemology (knowledge of the world). With some modi￿cations,
they can accommodate most scienti￿c realists. The main di⁄erences between scienti￿c realism and
other philosophies of science concern the role of theories as regards description, prediction and
explanation. A theory may do all three things but an empiricist￿ s basic instinct is to describe,
an instrumentalist￿ s is to predict and the scienti￿c realist￿ s is to explain (see, for example, Davis,
Hands and M￿ki 1998). The main opposition to scienti￿c realism at the levels of semantics, on-
tology and epistemology is methodological instrumentalism. As with the term ￿ realism￿there are
di⁄erent versions of instrumentalism. However, they have in common the basic view that the truth
or falsehood of theoretical statements is unimportant. Such statements are regarded as nothing
more than tools for generating predictions. They are seen simply as ￿ inference tickets￿from which
testable implications may be deduced. What matters for an instrumentalist is the ability of a theory
to generate testable predictions and their corroboration by empirical evidence (or the absence of
falsifying instances thereof - instrumentalism is broadly compatible with logical positivism, logi-
cal empiricism and falsi￿cationism). The main di⁄erences between instrumentalism and scienti￿c
realism are thus at the levels of semantics and epistemology. However, instrumentalism is not nec-
essarily inconsistent with realism at the ontological level. A modi￿ed form of instrumentalism can
accommodate the belief that the entities postulated by a scienti￿c theory exist but deny that the
truth or falsehood of statements about them matter in the appraisal of the theory (all that matters
in this regard is the accuracy of the predictions thereof).
For scienti￿c realists, knowledge of some aspect of the world is unsatisfactory if it is con￿ned
to description and prediction. In addition to the questions ￿what is this like?￿ and ￿what will
happen if￿ , such realists want to know why things are the way they are or happen the way they
do. Scienti￿c realism usually requires true explanations to be in terms of theoretical objects that
are not directly observable in the sense that we have no immediate sense impression thereof. Such
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appearance of things. Such realists hold that theoretical objects such as viruses, genes, electrons
and gravity exist (or refer to existing things) ￿even though they are not directly observable - and
that the inherent nature of such entities explains the various manifestations of things like illness,
intelligence, electricity and falling apples. A radical scienti￿c realist holds that only the objects of a
scienti￿c theory exist (or refer) whereas a radical commonsense realist holds that only our ordinary
unscienti￿c notions of things exist (or refer). Most realists fall somewhere in between these two
extremes.
Contrary to scienti￿c realism, are descriptions and predictions of observable objects and their
properties the only legitimate kinds of scienti￿c knowledge available to us? This is the position taken
by constructive empiricists such as van Fraassen (1980). Constructive empiricism gives science the
task of providing true descriptions of that which is observable - the ultimate aim of scienti￿c the-
orising is to construct models which are empirically adequate in this sense. As regards the hidden
entities, essences and causal mechanisms postulated by such theories, the constructive empiricist
does not deny their possible existence but suspends any judgement about them. Explanation is
relegated to the realm of pragmatic considerations about the many di⁄erent applied contexts or
settings in which the question ￿Why X?￿may be asked. By contrast scienti￿c realists are commit-
ted to the belief that purely theoretical explanation is both possible and desirable, with the idea of
explanation usually attached to some notion of causality or necessity. Thus for scienti￿c realists,
explanation requires an analysis of the hypothesized causal relationships between the objects of
scienti￿c inquiry. Constructive empiricism may be seen as a compromise between instrumentalism
and realism. Unlike the instrumentalist, the constructive empiricist does not deny that theoretical
statements are either true or false. Unlike the scienti￿c realist, however, the constructive empiri-
cist denies that we can know anything about the truth or falsehood of such statements beyond
descriptively or empirically adequate models designed to ￿save the phenomena￿ .
The standard view of scienti￿c explanation is the covering law or deductive-nomological model
outlined by Hempel and Oppenheimer (1948). The D-N model has proved popular in both the
natural and social sciences as it manages to combine elements of the empiricist, instrumentalist
and realist philosophies of science in a disarmingly simple way. The logic of the D-N model is that
any event (the explanandum) can be explained or subsumed under a given set of initial conditions
and at least one general law (the explanans). For example: metals expand when heated (general
law), therefore if copper is a metal and heat was applied to a piece of copper tubing without any
other relevant variable changing in any way (the initial and ceteris paribus conditions), then this is
su¢ cient to explain why the copper tubing expanded. The D-N model implies the symmetry thesis
that prediction and explanation are the same except for their time dimensions: prediction standing
before the event occurs and explanation after. As noted by Hands (1998) the D-N logic of scienti￿c
explanation remains the workhorse of the sciences, including economics (being compatible with
both logical empiricism and Popperian falsi￿cationism). However, it is precisely the D-N inferential
model of explanation that has come under ￿re from realists such as Lawson in his critique of
mainstream economics, as discussed further in section 3.
2 M￿ki: dialectical realism
M￿ki is a philosopher with a strong interest in the methodology of economics. Some of his more
important early contributions regarding the application of philosophical realism to economics are
M￿ki (1986; 1988; 1989; 1990A; 1992). In much of this work there is a clear emphasis on the
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economics is ￿built upon realist and essentialist premises￿and provides ￿a reconstructive interpre-
tation of the deep structure of the Austrian approach to explaining economic phenomena￿(M￿ki
1990A: 310). For this reason M￿ki￿ s approach to realism in economics has sometimes been labelled
￿essentialist scienti￿c realism￿(see Boylan and O= Gorman 1995: 131 and 175).
However, many of M￿ki￿ s contributions are more wide-ranging than such essentialist interpreta-
tions or reconstructions of economics. The clari￿cation of conceptual issues such as referentiality,
truth, representation, common sense realism, the realisticness of assumptions, isolation and ideal-
ization, and the use of models in economics are not con￿ned to the narrower thesis of essentialism.
M￿ki suggests that, ￿realism about science should be contextualized in terms of peculiarities of
particular disciplines and kinds of theories￿and that ￿This amounts to a defence of concrete and
local as against abstract and global philosophy of science￿(M￿ki 1996: 427). Re￿ ecting at a later
stage on his approach to the philosophy and methodology of economics, M￿ki (2002: 91) comments
that, in contrast to the usual ￿top-down￿prescriptive approach: ￿￿ Bottom-up approach￿may be
an approximately accurate label for some of my work, but taken together, it may be more accurate
to view the totality of my research on the topic as a manifestation of a dialectical approach where
philosophical concepts are adjusted and created in the light of empirical information concerning the
actualities of economics￿(my emphasis). Thus a study of realism in economics may have lessons
for the realist philosophy of science as well as economics.
This re￿ exive interaction between the two disciplines and the broad scope of such analysis
suggests that the essentialist label used to describe M￿ki￿ s approach is too restrictive. In my
opinion, taking M￿ki￿ s own cue in this regard, a better label is ￿dialectical realism￿both in the
broad sense of ￿the testing of truth by discussion, logical disputation and criticism dealing with
metaphysical contradictions and their solutions￿(Oxford Reference Dictionary) and in the sense of
a re￿ exive interaction between the two subjects. Whatever label we wish to use, M￿ki￿ s approach
is a refreshing change from the standard dogmatic response that if economics does not meet with
some preconceived notion of realism (derived from analyses of the natural sciences) then economics
and realism just do not ￿t (with the usually implied criticism that it has somehow failed an exam
and is thus de￿cient in this respect).
It is useful to group M￿ki￿ s published work into three categories, despite the considerable overlap
between them. One category concerns the analysis of a particular school of thought in economics (or
exponent thereof) to see how it might be construed along realist lines. As M￿ki (2002: 91) puts it:
￿The ￿rst is to look at the actual theories, methods, and meta-theoretical views held by practicing
economists, and to see whether there are plausible interpretations and reconstructions that would
be consistent with versions of realism.￿The main contributions here include his analyses of Austrian
explanation (M￿ki 1990A and 1990B), Milton Friedman (M￿ki 1992), institutional economics (M￿ki
1993), and Ronald Coase (M￿ki 1998). A second category comprises papers that subject economic
discourse to the rigours of analytical philosophy with two main aims in mind: to provide conceptual
clari￿cation of the terminology and methods commonly used by economists and to focus on the
peculiarities of economics as a scienti￿c discipline from a philosophical perspective (see M￿ki 1988,
1989, 1990C, 1996, 2005). A third category includes the examination of arguments against realism
in economics ￿ most of which, according to M￿ki, do not stand up to close scrutiny and are
usually found to be nonreasons for nonrealism in economics (see M￿ki 1993, 1996, 2000, 2002).
M￿ki￿ s approach in this regard is to argue that, ￿Even if P, realism about economics is not thereby
discredited where ￿ P￿designates such a premise which is believed to entail nonrealism￿(M￿ki 2002:
92). There is considerable overlap between the three categories and the separation is to some extent
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area more manageable. A representative paper from each of the above categories is selected for
further examination.
2.1 Scienti￿c realism and Austrian explanation
M￿ki (1990A) provides a reconstruction of Austrian explanation along realist and essentialist lines.
He focuses on the signi￿cance of the invisible hand in Austrian explanation with speci￿c reference
to the quantity theory of money. In this context, M￿ki examines various aspects of Austrian
explanation that uncover its realist premises and contrasts this with the instrumentalist D-N model
of explanation. The important aspects of Austrian explanation in this regard are: redescription,
identi￿cation, ontological uni￿cation, and the asymmetry of explanation and prediction.
Explanation as redescription involves various aspects. A realist explanation should reveal the
true nature or deep essence of the phenomena in question and is not content with empirical gener-
alisations based on surface appearances. For example, Austrians are not content with D-N explana-
tions of in￿ ation that do not go beyond the covering law argument showing that price increases are
strictly proportional to increases in the quantity of money. There is dissatisfaction with the idea
that macroeconomic aggregates have a real ontological existence and genuine causal relationship
detached from the beliefs, intentions, subjective valuations and actions at the level of the individ-
ual. Thus the true nature and a real understanding of the relationship between in￿ ation and the
quantity of money can only be achieved through further redescription of these phenomena ￿and
this invariably requires, in Austrian explanation, a microreduction to the individual since economic
and statistical aggregates are regarded as nothing more than the outcomes of individual beliefs,
valuations and actions.
Explanatory redescription thus also entails identifying what is essential about the social entities
in question. M￿ki asserts that, ￿Austrian economists at least implicitly subscribe to the following
two general identi￿cation statements as part of their approach:
Social entities are aggregates or averages of individual entities, these latter entities being
invested with meaning by acting individuals. (A)
Social entities are unintended consequences of actions by human individuals. (C)￿(ibid.
324, his emphasis)
M￿ki calls (A) the aggregative principle and (C) the causal principle of the constitution of
social entities with the latter ￿the most distinctive ingredient in the Austrian way of explaining
economic phenomena￿(ibid. 325). Social entities (such as the demand and supply of money, the
in￿ ation rate, markets, GDP) are not simply the result of individual actions, but the unintended
consequence thereof. In contrast to approaches that emphasise government agency and social
planning, a distinctive feature of Austrian explanation is the importance attached to the unintended
outcomes of spontaneous market processes guided by the invisible hand. Both (A) and (C) are
consistent with a scienti￿c realist view of Austrian explanation in that they require social aggregates
and the relationships between them to be redescribed at the underlying level of individual human
action.
For example, as noted above, the Austrians reject the strict proportionality between prices and
money implied by the ￿ mechanical￿version of the quantity theory: ￿They claim (and this claim
would be impossible without identi￿cation statements such as (A) and (C)) that during the process
whereby the additional money enters the economy, changes will take place in the ￿ microstructure￿
6of the system (valuations and expectations of individuals, distribution of incomes, exchange ratios
between goods)...This implies the rejection of the proportionality theorem...￿ (ibid. 328). It
might be noted here that this view is also consistent with Keynes￿assertion that the demand for
money and velocity of circulation of money are not stable functions independent of changes in the
money stock.
Explanatory redescription achieves the further aim of ontological uni￿cation, which is a key fea-
ture of scienti￿c realism. Ontological uni￿cation brings about a common underlying explanation,
in Austrian economics at the deeper micro level of the individual, of apparently diverse and inde-
pendent phenomena. M￿ki (1990A: 330) refers to Menger￿ s (1976: 173) claims ￿that all phenomena
of value are the same in nature and origin, and that the magnitude of value is always governed
according to the same principles￿and to von Mises￿ s (1953: 144 ￿45) criticism of theories of money
and interest that determine their value di⁄erently rather than as having the same essential cause,
that is, the subjective valuations placed on these objects by individuals.
M￿ki (1990A: 331) notes an important distinction between logical and ontological uni￿cation:
￿Logical uni￿cation is brought about when more and more statements within a discipline become
derivable from the same set of axioms, or when the same set of statements becomes derivable from a
smaller set of axioms.￿Logical uni￿cation is epitomised by general equilibrium theorising. Although
Austrian economics also relies on logical uni￿cation it is ontological uni￿cation, as described above,
that is the hallmark of Austrian explanation.
In what may be regarded as the standard or mainstream methodological approach, successful
prediction is the ultimate prize in economic science. By contrast, Austrian economists believe that
the mainstream concern with prediction is misguided because, unlike the material world of the
natural sciences, the economic realm is constituted by human individuals characterised by free will.
Austrian economists are sceptical of predictions derived from the empirical generalisations of the
D-N or covering law model as such generalisations are not strictly or universally true. They may be
true of a limited domain of economic phenomena but it is precisely the work of scienti￿c theories
at the micro level to explain why this may be the case.
In explaining the limitations of predictions based on empirical generalisations, M￿ki refers to the
twin concepts of a closed and an open system. A closed system is characterised by both extrinsic
and intrinsic closure conditions. The former requires that the system in reality be isolated from
external in￿ uences or that these in￿ uences remain constant, while the latter requires the internal
structure of the system to be constant (ibid. 332). Only a closed system can provide generalisations
with no exceptions and only then can there be any faith in the reliability of predictions derived
from such generalisations. Since a real economy (as opposed to a theoretical model thereof) is
characterised by open systems in which either or both the extrinsic and intrinsic conditions fail to
hold, the emphasis on prediction is misguided and the predictions as such highly misleading.
For example, the prediction by the quantity theory that a given increase in the money supply
will lead to a strictly proportionate rise in prices is misleading because the intrinsic condition for
closure does not hold. As emphasised by Austrian economists, individuals￿past experience with
in￿ ation may lead to changes in expectations and valuations such that the real demand for money
changes, thereby altering the proportional relationship between money supply and prices. In short,
the complexity of economic interactions at the micro level militates against the identi￿cation and
isolation of closed systems in real world economies, thereby making the aim of prediction a much
more questionable enterprise than, perhaps, in the natural sciences where such closures may be
identi￿ed more readily.
72.2 Realism vs realisticness
M￿ki￿ s (1989) paper ￿On the Problem of Realism in Economics￿is a classic example of his varied
contributions to the task of terminological and conceptual clari￿cation in economics. These purely
analytical tasks exemplify the traditionally conceived role of philosophy as the ￿ handmaiden￿of the
sciences, removing conceptual and semantic stumbling blocks to the progress of science in explaining,
predicting and applying knowledge of the real world. On this view, it is not in the job description
of philosophers to comment on the actual content of scienti￿c theories or get their hands dirty with
the empirical aspects thereof.
As regards economics, M￿ki contends that progress has been stulti￿ed by various terminological
and conceptual confusions. In particular, he asserts that the perennial debate about the realism of
assumptions and theories in economics is misconstrued in that, on closer examination, the debate
is only tangentially about the issue of realism as a philosophical doctrine. According to M￿ki, what
economists are often arguing about is what he calls the ￿ realisticness￿of assumptions and theories,
and to avoid ambiguity he recommends that these two terms be separated and made distinct
conceptually. M￿ki (1989: 194) explains why he regards ￿ realism￿as ￿designating a collection of
ontological and semantic doctrines￿ in contrast to ￿ realisticness￿as ￿designating a collection of
attributes predicable of representations￿and then goes on to show how realisticness at times may
be connected to the issue of realism in economics, referring to the work of Machlup, Friedman,
Kirzner and Simon as regards the theory of the ￿rm.
In comparing the ideas of realism and realisticness, M￿ki notes ￿rst that there are many versions
or aspects of philosophical realism, including amongst others, ontological, referential, representa-
tional, veristic, commonsense and methodological realism. These realisms have little direct link
to what often passes as arguments about the realism of this or that assumption or theory when
economists are really arguing about the (realistic or unrealistic) way in which such assumptions or
theories represent the world: ￿A representation can be said to be realistic if it is about reality (i.e.
it refers factually) or about observables (i.e. it refers observationally) or about essentials (i.e. it
refers essentially), or if it represents what it refers to, or if it is true of what it represents￿(ibid.
196). Other senses in which a theoretical representation may be said to be realistic is ￿if it has been
tested and well con￿rmed, or if it is plausible, or a useful approximation, or practically relevant,
etc￿(ibid. 196). In short, realism is a ￿ theory of theories￿or philosophical metatheory, whereas
￿ realisticness￿is a multifaceted property of theories themselves.
These distinctions are clari￿ed further with reference to methodological views on the theory of
the ￿rm by the above-mentioned authors. As noted by M￿ki, none of these economists present
a fully consistent appraisal but rather an amalgam of metatheoretical views. For example, Fried-
man￿ s views suggest that he is an ontological, referential, representational, and veristic realist, but a
methodological non-realist (ibid. 202). Friedman believes that real business ￿rms exist (ontological
realist), that the neoclassical theory refers to such ￿rms (referential realist) and represents them
falsely (representational realist), and that the falsity of the neoclassical assumptions about the ￿rm
is a desirable property of such theories (veristic realist). The latter so-called F-twist is a distinc-
tive feature of Friedman￿ s methodological instrumentalism. Economic theories are instruments for
generating predictions, on this view, but not in the usual sense of such theories being neither true
nor false ￿they indeed have a truth-value in being descriptively false, wildly inaccurate even, and
this is deemed by Friedman to be a desirable property.
M￿ki shows that Friedman is more of a realist than Machlup. Machlup denies that real neoclas-
sical business ￿rms exist because as such they are literally unobservable. The neoclassical ￿rm is
viewed as a ￿ctional entity responding passively to changes in situational factors such as costs and
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￿rm is concerned exclusively with its role in coordinating a competitive market system of prices,
inputs and outputs. The internal structure, organisation and decision-making aspects comprising
the commonsense notion of the ￿rm are ignored. Other theories of the ￿rm, such as the behavioural,
managerial and organizational theories are designed for the purpose of explaining these factors and
Machlup is a meta-theoretical realist in this regard ￿he holds that such ￿rms exist and in many
respects are more realistic than the neoclassical theory of the ￿rm. In summary, as regards the neo-
classical theory of the ￿rm Machlup is an ontological, referential and representational non-realist in
both the descriptive and normative senses. However, as regards business ￿rms in general Machlup
is an ontological commonsense realist holding that such ￿rms are observable and can be referred
to and represented by other theories with a di⁄erent aim in mind ￿to uncover and explain the
microstructure of such ￿rms rather than their coordinating role in a competitive market system.
While Machlup and Friedman provide methodological defences of the ￿ unrealisticness￿of the
neoclassical theory of the ￿rm, Kirzner and Simon criticise the theory for being unrealistic in its
di⁄erent senses. Kirzner believes that the neoclassical theory of the ￿rm ignores what is the essential
feature of real business ￿rms, entrepreneurial alertness. Austrian ￿rms are not passive recipients
of information that respond robotically by calculating the relevant costs, prices and quantities and
moving automatically to their constrained pro￿t maximising equilibrium positions. Austrian ￿rms
are purposeful in seeking out new opportunities for pro￿t and adapting the means of production to
this end.
Thus, according to M￿ki (1989: 204), Austrian economists like Kirzner are methodological
realists: they regard their theory of the ￿rm as having an explanatory power that is not reducible
to predictive success. They are also commonsense realists who view such ￿rms as encompassing
everyday notions of purposefulness in discovering and learning about their business environment.
Also, by capturing what they regard as the entrepreneurial essence of the ￿rm, Austrians may be
seen as referential, representational and veristic realists: the Austrian theory of the ￿rm refers to
existing ￿rms, represents them in a particular way and, moreover, is held to be a true representation
of the essential aspects thereof. However, the Austrian view of the ￿rm is similar in some respects
to that of Machlup. Like Machlup, the Austrians ignore the internal organization and managerial
decision-making aspects that are part of our everyday notions of existing business ￿rms. Like
Machlup, they also focus on the role of the ￿rm in coordinating the market process. Hence in
this respect the Austrian theory is unrealistic in that it does not describe these aspects of existing,
observable business ￿rms.
By contrast, Simon makes the information and decision-making processes the central feature
of his behavioral theory of the ￿rm. For Simon, the neoclassical theory is de￿cient because it
ignores these observable features of business ￿rms and does not refer to or represent them in any
way. In contrast to both Friedman and Machlup, Simon is a methodological realist believing that
a theory of the ￿rm should strive for true propositions of how ￿rms really behave. Moreover,
instead of armchair theorising, business ￿rms should be subjected to close empirical analysis to
observe how they actually function. According to M￿ki, such analysis leads Simon to recommend
a ￿new realism￿ in which ￿The neoclassical fully informed, maximizing ￿rm should give way to
the searching, information processing and satis￿cing ￿rm. As to the notion of rationality in the
study of decision-making, he advocates switching attention from what he calls perfect substantive
rationality or results of choice to bounded procedural rationality or the process of choice￿(ibid.
206).
M￿ki￿ s analysis shows that Simon also prefers theories of the ￿rm that are more realistic in the
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how that position is actually reached by business ￿rms ￿in other words, opening up the comparative
statics ￿ black box￿of neoclassical theory) and the assumptions of the theory being con￿rmed by
empirical evidence. Simon also appears to be a veristic realist in stating that the neoclassical theory
of the ￿rm is de￿cient, not because it simpli￿es or idealizes the way ￿rms really behave, but because
the representations it makes (￿ ￿rms desire to maximise pro￿ts￿and ￿ businessmen can compute and
identify the pro￿t maximising course of action￿ ) are false. Simon accepts the need for any theory
to simplify to some extent but within the bounds of what are reasonably good approximations to
the truth ￿which neoclassical theory fails to do. To sum up in M￿ki￿ s words: ￿In conclusion, it
can be said that Herbert Simon￿ s ￿new realism￿amounts to varieties of commonsense realism with
special emphasis on the realisticness of economic theories, most often in the dual sense of being
both comprehensive and empirically con￿rmed, and sometimes also in the sense of being true￿(ibid.
210).
2.3 Non-reasons against realism in economics
M￿ki (2002) provides a classic rebuttal of some of the main arguments against realism about eco-
nomics. His strategy is to argue, ￿Even if P, realism about economics is not thereby discredited￿
where ￿P￿designates such a premise which is believed to entail nonrealism￿(M￿ki 2002: 92). The
premises in question are: economic theory postulates unobservables; economic theory simpli￿es
and includes false assumptions; economic theory does not refer to anything that would ￿t its de-
scription; economics is policy-ine⁄ective; the economy is economics dependent; accepted theories
and statements of fact are results of rhetorical persuasion; economic identities are mind dependent.
M￿ki￿ s counter-arguments for each are described brie￿ y as follows.
Being unobservable does not necessarily imply nonrealism. M￿ki notes that it is precisely by
invoking the existence of entities that are not directly observable (eg. electrons, quarks, viruses)
that theories in the natural sciences have explanatory power and success in controlling certain phe-
nomena. Such unobservables do not preclude a realist view of such theories, and neither should they
of economic theories. M￿ki also notes that many terms used in economics do refer to observables
in the sense of commonsensibles such as tastes, choices, ￿rms, markets, households etc being part
of the common everyday ontic furniture of the economy. According to M￿ki (2002: 95) it is the
peculiar way in which they are represented in some economic theories that is the real issue, not
their observability as such.
M￿ki asserts that since all theories simplify, all theories are inherently false ￿so there is nothing
special about economic theories in this regard (see section 4 below for more on the contrast between
M￿ki and Lawson as regards abstraction, isolation and idealization). M￿ki suggests that there are
two main questions pertinent to economics here: ￿(a) Could a theory involving falsehood possibly
serve the pursuit of truth? (b) Could a theory involving falsehood possibly be true?￿(ibid. 96). As
regards (a), this is an argument popular in economics: false assumptions will gradually give way
to better approximations to reality as we gain greater understanding of the economy. However, as
noted by M￿ki, this process is seldom taken very far in mainstream economic theory. As regards
(b), M￿ki suggests that false assumptions can be rephrased, in which case the theory might be
true ￿for example, instead of assuming that a factor X is absent such a theory might assert that
the in￿ uence of X on the phenomena in question is negligible. At another level, M￿ki (2002: 96)
asserts that simpli￿cations and falsehoods are necessary to help slice up the world and isolate a
particular subsystem or fragment of reality. Only if one insisted that the entire universe were some
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realism about economic theories on these grounds.
Many economic theories do not appear to refer to anything that is real and therefore, according
to this argument against realism about economics, the question of their truth does not even arise
in the ￿rst place. Such theories (eg. the perfectly competitive ￿rm) are about ￿ctitious entities
and therefore preclude a realist interpretation. However, M￿ki notes that the multifunctionality of
language allows one to distinguish between the referential and attributive aspects of theories. The
theory of the perfectly competitive ￿rm may thus indeed refer to real ￿rms even though the idealised
features it attributes to them may be false. In other words, ￿The falsehood of assumptions does
not undermine reference ￿even though it undermines their truth. And even though it undermines
the truth of the assumptions, it does not necessarily undermine the truth of the theory￿(ibid. 97).
The presumed policy ine⁄ectiveness of economics has led some to assert that the ￿no miracle￿
argument for realism about the natural sciences does not apply to economics. We have faith in
realism to the extent that technologies and interventions based on a theory succeed. Economic
policies routinely fail, so our faith in realism about economics is misplaced. M￿ki counters this
argument by noting the Cairnes-Robbins train of thought that we have more direct access to
the fundamental entities of economic reality than the entities hypothesised by the natural sciences.
Therefore the roundabout ￿no miracle￿argument as regards realism about economics is unnecessary.
Moreover, M￿ki notes that the ￿no miracle￿argument can be reversed: given the complexity and
di¢ culty in isolating relatively independent subsystems in the social world, it would be a miracle if
economic theories did make accurate predictions and allow successful interventions in this regard.
M￿ki (2002: 98) also notes that even if we accept the ￿no miracle￿argument, this does not preclude
a weaker form of realism that economic theories may be true and that economic entities may exist
(rather than they are true and do exist respectively).
To say that the economy is economics dependent could mean at least two di⁄erent things. It
could mean conceptual construction whereby the world is what our theories say it is. On this view,
the representations made by models and theories do not uncover the real world, they are the world.
Social and economic structures are, on this account, conceptual inventions rather than discovered
facts. As noted by M￿ki (2002: 101), realism cannot easily accommodate such a belief. However,
realism can accommodate the view that the economy is causally constructed in the sense that people
holding a certain economic theory act upon their beliefs in a way that reproduces the content and
implications of the theory. Conceptual construction is not open to factual debate whereas the truth
or falsehood of causal construction can, in principle, be established empirically.
Rhetoric can persuade economists to accept or reject a theory but it does not thereby determine
the truth or falsehood thereof. M￿ki contrasts the rhetoric argument with the na￿ve view in which
theories are accepted or rejected to the extent that they are either true or false which in turn depends
on reality. Both arguments are ￿ awed in tying truth and existence too closely to the acceptance and
rejection of theories. Thus one can accept the premise that the acceptance and rejection of economic
theories is a matter of rhetorical persuasion, without having to accept the nonrealist argument that
truth and existence are determined thereby. M￿ki again invokes the multifunctionality of language
to show that sentences may both represent and persuade: ￿Using a piece of language rhetorically
does not exclude its (simultaneous) use for making possibly true claims about reality. Whatever
persuades economists may be true ￿or false. Persuasion does not make it so￿(ibid. 101).
A realist interpretation of economics would have to be able to accommodate the fact that
many of its theoretical entities (such as expectations, preferences, utility) are mind-dependent.
M￿ki notes that most philosophers have de￿ned realism in these terms. However, this is a good
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may be used to re￿ne concepts and arguments in philosophy (rather than trying to ￿t economics
into a preconceived philosophy of the natural sciences). At the ontological level, there are good
grounds for realism about mind-dependent entities. M￿ki suggests that we distinguish between the
propositions that economic entities are dependent on the minds of economic actors and whether
they are dependent on the minds of economists as such. The former can be readily accommodated
by an adjustment in the de￿nition of philosophical realism. The latter returns us to the distinction
made above between conceptual and causal construction and the same arguments apply in this case.
M￿ki concedes that he has matched each of the above nonrealist arguments against a weak
version of realism that ￿Entity X might exist￿[R1] and ￿Theory T might be true￿[R2] rather than
a stronger realist position that ￿Entity X exists￿[R3] and ￿Theory T is true￿[R4]. He suggests
that this is necessary for two reasons. First, it must be established that economics can survive [R1]
and [R2] before it is subjected to stronger tests implied by [R3] and [R4]. Second, the arguments
in support of the two versions of realism about economics are di⁄erent: ￿Ultimately, one wants to
critically examine particular economic theories for their truth and particular postulated entities for
their existence. Such an examination will not get o⁄ the ground if economics as a discipline does
not yield to a realist interpretation in the sense of [R1] and [R2]￿and ￿My fear is that giving up
[R1] and [R2] would result in the worst form of complacency. The resolution of the ultimate issue
of whether economics is in touch with the facts or whether it is a game of just playing with ￿ctions
would be biased towards the latter alternative￿(ibid. 102).
It seems that, on M￿ki￿ s account, economics can be accommodated by weaker forms of philo-
sophical realism. M￿ki suggests that despite appearances there is more realism in economics than
meets the eye and that, for example, even Friedman turns out to be a realist in the end! However,
the ￿nding that economics can be construed as such does not impress those who feel that ￿ weak
realism￿is far too permissive and allows mainstream economic theorising to get away with far too
much wrongdoing. As discussed in section 3 below, Lawson is an example of just such a critical
realist who believes that economics is not ￿in touch with the facts￿and is indeed largely ￿a game
of just playing with ￿ctions.￿
3 Lawson: critical realism
Lawson￿ s background is quite di⁄erent to M￿ki￿ s. As noted above, M￿ki is a philosopher who
turned to economics and has used it as a dialectical testing ground for various propositions about
philosophical realism. Lawson was a mathematician who then retooled as an academic (Marxist)
economist and subsequently became interested in the philosophy and methodology of economics:
￿Having come to economics by way of ￿rst studying mathematics I was immediately impressed by,
as I saw it, the widespread and rather uncritical application of formalistic methods and systems
to conditions for which they were obviously quite unsuited. In consequence, my interests turned
fairly quickly to questions of ontology, and speci￿cally to the study of how methods and modes
of reasoning might be fashioned to insights concerning the nature of social being. However, I ￿rst
approached these issues by way of reading economists rather than philosophers￿ (Lawson 1997:
xiii).
Lawson and M￿ki also di⁄er in the way in which they have published their views. M￿ki has
almost exclusively published his ideas in the form of journal articles or as chapter contributions to
books (or in the form of Prefaces or Introductions to books which he has edited). While Lawson has
also published widely through these channels, his ideas are collected and developed more fully in two
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2003).
This is perhaps more than just a matter of taste as it reveals, even at this basic level, a funda-
mental di⁄erence in approach and aims. M￿ki￿ s approach is to focus on speci￿c issues in economics
of interest to philosophers (and to economists in philosopher￿ s clothing), with the aim of conceptual
and terminological clari￿cation. Despite some occasional, usually implied realist criticisms of main-
stream theorising and methodology, M￿ki is largely neutral regarding the content and practices
of orthodox economics. This approach allows M￿ki to write more compactly on speci￿c issues on
realism and economics. By contrast Lawson￿ s aim, as suggested by the title of his later book, is
to transform the accepted methodology of mainstream economics. The rationale for such a radical
transformation is provided in the form of a sustained realist attack on the orthodoxy, for which
short journal articles would not be able to do full justice. The appropriate medium for Lawson￿ s
critique is thus books in which these arguments can be developed more fully and where an adequate
response to the various counterarguments put forward by his critics can be given. Thus in what
follows, reference will be made mostly (although not exclusively) to Lawson￿ s books rather than
the various journal articles he has published.
The purpose of such criticism is not only the negative aim of showing the alleged inadequacies of
mainstream economics but also, more importantly, to reorient economics and show the possibilities
for bringing about fundamental change in society. This is done by noting that institutions and
other social organizations are the real product of human choices and practices and that these can
be in￿ uenced by ￿criticising the conceptions and understandings on which people act￿(Lawson
1997: 158). Although Lawson is not entirely happy with the label ￿ critical realism￿ , noting that
his account di⁄ers in some important respects from Roy Bhaskar￿ s seminal explanation thereof,
￿I persist with the label of critical realism, in short, in full recognition that it is an ascription
for which numerous conceptions may eventually equally qualify￿(ibid.). However, while the word
￿ critical￿denotes the broad thrust of his work, ￿ transcendental realism￿captures the speci￿c angle of
Lawson￿ s attack on mainstream economics and his proposed alternative. ￿ Transcendental realism￿
reveals the basic ontological point of departure for Lawson from the orthodox conception of reality
that he labels ￿ empirical realism￿ . According to Lawson, it is this impoverished conception of reality
that is the root cause of what he identi￿es as the inadequacies of mainstream economics and which
only an alternative ontology along the lines he suggests can resolve satisfactorily.
3.1 Ontology
Because ontological concerns are at the heart of Lawson￿ s arguments it is a good idea to start by
explaining Lawson￿ s conception of the role and scope of ontology more carefully, in general and
more speci￿cally in the social sciences. For Lawson, the term ontology means the study of being in
two related senses:
1. Something that is, or exists; an entity, a thing
2. What it is to be or to exist; what all the things that are have in common. (Lawson 2004: 1)
Lawson calls (1) scienti￿c ontology. Clearly to make such an ontological study manageable it
must be con￿ned to those entities or things about a particular aspect of the world or domain - a study
of everything that exists is untenable. Moreover such studies must be con￿ned to what are thought
to be the most basic or signi￿cant entities and things in this regard. Lawson calls (2) philosophical
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features which all the entities identi￿ed in (1) for a particular domain have in common. Hence the
task of philosophical ontology is broadly taxonomic and to provide a categorial grammar whereby
seemingly diverse entities under a certain domain are related by virtue of common, often hidden
features and essential characteristics. Neither (1) nor (2) are ￿xed or unchanging as they depend
on the speci￿c context of the study and are historically relative.
Lawson makes a further key distinction between ontological analysis along the lines suggested
above and studies of the theories as such and the claims to knowledge based on them. The latter is a
study of the presuppositions and beliefs about what exists held by a theorist by virtue of subscribing
to a particular theory, system of theories, paradigm, research programme or what have you. Such
studies include issues such as the plausibility of scienti￿c theories, the acceptance or rejection of
theories and the claims to knowledge about the world in this regard. To confuse the two types of
analysis, according to Lawson, is to commit the epistemic fallacy: ￿To suppose that the study of
being can be reduced to the study of theories and their presuppositions (about being) is to commit
the epistemic fallacy, to reduce ontology to epistemology￿ . Lawson coins the terms ontographology
and opology to distinguish such analysis from ontology proper, where the ￿ graph￿in ontographology
￿means (the art of) writing or describing or representing￿and where the op in opology ￿stands in
for ontological presuppositions (incorporating ontological premises and ontological posits)￿(ibid.
2).
Lawson believes that both scienti￿c and philosophical ontology are possible and desirable. This
is in sharp contrast to many philosophers of science who believe that the only legitimate role of
ontology is in the study about being and not of being or, in Lawson￿ s terms, ontographology or
opology. Thus for these philosophers only the study of the ontological presuppositions of theories
and their consistency with the world views, beliefs and knowledge claims espoused by the theorist
is deemed to be of any value. Some philosophers take a less extreme position ￿they hold that
substantive ontology is possible but only to the extent that the entities posited by our best scienti￿c
theories are regarded as reliable enough to be a⁄orded an independent real existence. ￿ Best￿in this
context invariably means theories of the natural sciences. This is the naturalist position held by
philosophers such as Quine who a⁄ord such theories an elite status as a ￿ top rate conceptual system￿
in contrast to ￿ a second grade conceptual system￿descriptive of other theorising (such as the social
sciences). More accommodating still are those who see a limited role for philosophical ontology
as well but believe that it must be tied to successful scienti￿c practice (again, invariably that of
the natural sciences). For example, Pratten shows that although Lawson and Cartwright share
similar ontological concerns, Cartwright is far less ambitious than Lawson in using philosophical
ontological analysis to form our ideas of social reality because, ￿It seems that while she is prepared
to develop some speculative hypotheses about the structure of the world where these are motivated
by observations about successful scienti￿c practice, she is less prepared to start from generalised
features of experience unrelated to successful science￿(Pratten, forthcoming: 23). Di⁄erent degrees
of commitment to the role and scope of ontology can thus be discerned: denialists who reject any
role for scienti￿c or philosophical ontology and who only see value in the internal metaphysics of
ontographological/opological studies; weak ontologists like Quine who subscribe to a dilute version
of scienti￿c ontology in which only the entities posited by theories of the natural sciences count;
semi-strong ontologists like Cartwright, who also allow a limited role for philosophical ontology but
limit their speculative hypothesizing about reality to that based on observations about our best
and most successful natural scienti￿c practice; strong ontologists in the critical realism fold such
as Lawson, who see a much broader and radical role for scienti￿c and philosophical ontology in the
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Philosophical ontology can take di⁄erent forms. Lawson￿ s preferred brand is that of transcen-
dental realism as described by Bhaskar whereby we move deductively from certain generalised
features of our experience and practices (premises) to infer what the world must be like to make the
existence of these experiences and practices possible (conclusions): ￿On the transcendental realist
view of science, then, its essence lies in the movement at any one level from knowledge of manifest
phenomena to knowledge, produced by means of antecedent knowledge, of the structures that gen-
erate them￿(Bhaskar 1989: 20). For example, Lawson, following Bhaskar, notes the widespread
use of the experimental method in the natural sciences whereby event regularities are successfully
engineered by isolating, separating and triggering causal mechanisms in a laboratory setting. These
generally accepted premises, in turn, thus imply general features or properties of the natural world
such as its structure, causality, separability and openness/closure that make successful scienti￿c
practices such as experimental control intelligible However, Lawson emphasizes that transcendental
realism is not the only approach to philosophical ontology: ￿But I do not suggest that this is the
only method of philosophical ontology, and even less de￿ne it in terms of (that) method￿(Lawson
2004: 10). Moreover, the transcendental method he proposes is not the same as the transcendental
idealism of Kant in which the derived concepts of human thought are universal and infallible. For
Lawson, transcendental reasoning under his de￿nition of philosophical ontology can be accepted
￿just as fallible, practically conditioned investigation into some or other feature of our experience,
a practice taking, in philosophical ontology, the form of an investigation into generalised features
of our experience, including human activities￿(ibid.).
Lawson distinguishes between the natural and social domains by including within the latter
everything that depends, at least in part, on us for its existence. Thus (1) becomes social scienti￿c
ontology (the study of the most basic or signi￿cant entities in the social domain) and (2) becomes
social philosophic ontology (the study of what such social entities have in common and what makes
their existence possible). As regards (1) Lawson notes that, despite the widely held belief that
ontology is less problematic in the natural sciences, social scienti￿c ontology has at least one ad-
vantage in this regard. There is less reason to doubt the commonsense ontic furniture of the social
world than the postulated entities of the natural world which may only be accessible to us indirectly
(for example, atoms can only be observed via the medium of an electron microscope). By contrast,
markets, money, institutions, ￿rms and the like are direct features of our everyday experience in
a way that electrons, electromagnetic waves and quarks are not. However, what is more problem-
atic is the way in which such social entities are represented in economic theories: ￿The primary
problem with social scienti￿c theorising lies not with identifying the categories (although it may be
that a realistic analysis may throw up hitherto unrecognised categories) but in the fact that such
categories as appear vital are treated di⁄erently in competing theories￿(ibid. 12). This, one may
notice, bears close resemblance to Maki￿ s observations about commonsense realism and the need to
distinguish conceptually between realism (as a philosophical analysis of theories) and realisticness
(as a property of a speci￿c theory in the way it represents certain entities) in economics (see also
section 4 below for further discussion of the similarities and di⁄erences between M￿ki and Lawson).
Lawson suggests that even if analyses of the social domain were limited to ontographologi-
cal/opological studies about the internal metaphysics of social theories, this would be of consider-
able value in itself. Social opology can help clarify the ontological presuppositions and thereby aid
the interpretation of the theorist￿ s claims about the world against other contributions to the subject
(eg. by showing that Marx￿ s theory of capitalism is not, in fact, a deterministic theory). It can
also help to reveal possible inconsistencies between the ontological presuppositions and other beliefs
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theorising is essentially the same as Adam Smith￿ s explanation of the invisible hand in his Wealth
of Nations). However, for Lawson social opology does not go far enough. Such studies are unable
to ￿provide insight into the basic structure of social reality; it throws little if any light on the world
beyond our conceptions of it. It would be preferable to engage in social scienti￿c ontology. But is
it possible?￿(ibid. 14).
Lawson￿ s various contributions to the subject are aimed at outlining how social scienti￿c
ontology is possible (indeed necessary) and how, perhaps more contentiously, philosophical ontol-
ogy can aid this endeavour. Lawson shows how social philosophical ontology can give order and
a conceptual framework to our thinking about the basic entities and things existing in the social
domain. However, Lawson concedes that philosophical ontology cannot by itself give a more sub-
stantive account of social reality and that it must be supplemented by empirical studies to this
end. The role of philosophical ontology is to give directionality to social theorising such that the
identi￿cation and explanation of signi￿cant social entities and mechanisms must be consistent with
it. For example, Lawson asserts that our everyday interactions with, and observations about, the
social world provide us with what he suggests are essentially uncontested premises, for example
that: all social practices are partially routinised; society is structured according to social rules and
codes; such rules condition but are not the same as social practices; society is structured according
to social positions and internal relations between such positions; social structures are enduring and
are capable of reproducing themselves; change and transformation are an inherent quality of such
social structures; social reality is characterised by openness in that the relations and interconnec-
tivity between its di⁄erent aspects mean that they cannot be easily isolated and separated under
experimental conditions; social reality comprises di⁄erent strata in which higher strata emerge from
more basic lower strata; the higher strata remain dependent on the lower strata for their existence
and contain causal powers irreducible to those operating at the lower level. These broad features of
social reality, arrived at retroductively through philosophical ontological analysis, imply that social
reality is ￿an emergent, open-ended, structured, transformational process in motion, in which the
parts are constituted in and through their (changing) relations to each other￿(ibid. 19). More
detailed empirical studies of these social entities and realities falling under social scienti￿c ontology
proper are thus inescapably conditioned and directed in a way consistent with such conceptions
arrived at via the antecedent process of philosophical ontological analysis.
With the above description of Lawson￿ s ontological point of departure in mind, the following
sections ￿ esh out his critical realist approach and speci￿c critique of mainstream economics in more
detail. The attention then turns to a more evaluative comparison of Lawson￿ s ideas with those of
M￿ki.
3.2 Empirical realism, event regularities and deductivism
For Lawson, ￿ empirical realism￿identi￿es reality, in both the natural and social worlds, with the
sense impressions or observation of atomistic events and their constant conjunctions. This is a
Humean conception of reality in terms of which we have no logical basis for inferring the presence
of causality, powers, essences or intermediate structures. For the empirical realist all that matters
are correlations between individual events and these are the empirical bedrock upon which science is
built. More complex phenomena can, indeed must, be reduced to such more basic event regularities
and science consists largely of discovering such event regularities.
Once such event regularities have been reliably established they take the form of empirical gen-
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law￿or deductive-nomological D-N model of scienti￿c explanation in the natural sciences (see also
the discussion at the end of section 1 above). A similar deductive approach is discernible in the
model-building method of contemporary mainstream economics. However, Lawson notes that few
empirical generalisations approaching the reliability of such laws in the natural sciences have been
forthcoming in economics. According to Lawson, in economic models it is the axioms and as-
sumptions that provide the universal ￿ covering laws￿against which the predictions of the model are
derived and tested empirically. Although seldom stated explicitly, mainstream economics tacitly
endorses this mode of explanation: ￿In short, if a reliance upon the deductivist mode of explanation
is not always explicit in orthodox accounts, it is not denied. Rather a presumption of its centrality
and indeed universality in science is essentially taken for granted; so much so that any attempted
defence or justi￿cation of it is considered unnecessary￿(Lawson 1997: 92). For Lawson the un-
critical acceptance of the deductivist approach in mainstream economics has led to the untenable
situation in which the orthodoxy ￿nds itself ￿speci￿cally that it is unable to give a satisfactory
explanation of social reality ￿and his aim, ￿is to determine the character of social material which
would legitimise the wielding of methods and techniques premised upon the deductivist theory of
explanation and the associated conception of scienti￿c laws. Once this is achieved we can assess the
extent of relevance of the ontological conception uncovered and so of deductivism. More speci￿cally,
we can determine the actual bearing of the latter for the social domain￿(ibid. 18￿ 19).
3.3 Transcendental realism and analysis
As noted in section 3.1, Lawson proposes an alternative ontology consistent with what he labels
￿ transcendental realism￿ . Despite its name, this conception of social reality is not derived from
the Kantian idea of a priori knowledge of ￿ the thing in itself￿but from the work of Roy Bhaskar
(see Bhaskar 1978, 1979, 1986, 1989). Lawson notes two ways in which transcendental realism and
empirical realism di⁄er. The ￿rst di⁄erence is that ￿the world is composed not only of events and
states of a⁄airs and our experiences and impressions, but also of underlying structures, powers,
mechanisms and tendencies that exist, whether or not detected, and govern or facilitate actual
events￿and the second di⁄erence is that ￿on the transcendental realist conception, the di⁄erent
levels of reality are out of phase with each other￿(Lawson 1997: 21).
Three domains of reality are held to exist, rather than just the one of the empirical realist,
namely ￿the empirical (experience and impression), the actual (actual events and states of a⁄airs in
addition to the empirical) and the real (structures, powers, mechanisms and tendencies, in addition
to actual events and experiences)￿(ibid.). These three domains are held to be ontologically distinct
and irreducible to each other. Moreover they are out of phase in that one or more levels of reality
may not be manifest simultaneously. Lawson gives the example of a leaf blowing about in the wind.
Gravity is a real power acting upon the leaf resulting in a tendency for it to fall, but this power
on the leaf may be obscured by the countervailing powers of the wind, friction etc. Hence the real
mechanism of gravity is not in phase with the actual event of the leaf￿ s movement in the air (it might
be added that di⁄erent people viewing the same event might experience it di⁄erently in which case
the empirical and actual levels of reality are also out of phase). Tendencies are thus of fundamental
importance in transcendental realism: a tendency is an enduring power that acts unconditionally,
even if in conjunction with countervailing tendencies that mask its presence. Tendencies as such
are non-empirical and intransitive ￿they are transfactual statements about the casual structures,
powers and mechanisms that produce a particular result.
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abduction (or retroduction) to distinguish it from the more familiar modes of deduction and induc-
tion. For example, the move from the general claim that ￿ all ravens are black￿to the particular claim
that the next raven will be black is a deductive inference, compared to the inductive inference from
the observation of many black ravens to the general claim that ￿ all ravens are black￿ . By contrast,
abduction is a mode of reasoning from the observation that many ravens are black to propositions
about the types of mechanisms, causal powers and structures that predispose ravens to be black
(ibid. 24). Moreover, our knowledge about such powers and mechanisms is regarded as a transitive
￿produced means of production￿derived from the assembly of facts, hunches, hypotheses, intuitions
etc at any given time and which is in a continual state of ￿ ux as these assemblies are transformed
over time by ￿the laborious social practice of science￿(ibid. 25).
It is important to note that the argument for the transcendental realist ontology and mode of
explanation in economics is fallible and not based on an a priori premise. Speci￿cally the case for
transcendental realism in the social domain is not argued to be the same as for the natural sciences
and must take the pertinent realist features of society, such as intentional human agency and the
absence of any noteworthy event regularities, into account. Still it is clear throughout his work
that Lawson accepts the broad outline of transcendental realism as essentially correct even if the
speci￿c ontological conceptions of society that are tied to it are fallible and may be revised against
the results of ongoing research in this area (ibid. 27 ￿35, 157 ￿158).
With the tools of transcendental analysis in hand, a large part of Lawson￿ s e⁄orts are directed
to showing the various inconsistencies, impasses and other di¢ culties within the mainstream and
how various orthodox economists have responded to them. According to Lawson, such ￿ fractures￿
derive from the inappropriate empirical realist ontology and positivist-deductivist methodological
foundations of the mainstream project. Both econometrics and economic theory are singled out for
special attention.
3.4 Econometrics
Lawson sees the essence of econometrics as estimating Humean type constant conjunctions of event
regularities and thus to derive empirical laws in the social domain similar to the deterministic laws
of the natural sciences. In the probability framework of econometrics such regularities are renamed
stochastic event regularities. Lawson argues that no empirical laws comparable to those in the
natural sciences have as yet been discovered ￿and are unlikely to, given the ￿ awed conception of
social reality that the econometric approach is based on. Lawson points to the notorious unreliability
of the empirical ￿ laws￿and predictions derived from regression equations, where instability of the
parameter estimates is the rule rather than the exception.
Lawson also examines some of the responses to these problems from within the mainstream,
in particular the Lucas critique. Lucas, he suggests, correctly identi￿es a major problem with
regression estimates ￿they are not policy invariant as implicitly assumed in standard econometric
practice and thus cannot provide a reliable guide to policymakers. However, Lawson argues that
the responses to the Lucas critique do not (indeed cannot) resolve the problem because they do
not address the fundamental reasons for these di¢ culties. Lucas￿ s own initial response was to urge
policymakers to be guided by simple credible rules and to communicate e⁄ectively with the public
explaining the reasons for any major changes to such rules. The other main response has been
to argue that individuals understand the basic structure of the economy and how it operates and
rationally alter their expectations in response to policy change (for example, see Sargent 1986).
18Econometric models can be made internally consistent by endogenising expectations along the lines
suggested by the rational expectations hypothesis ￿meaning that expectations are determined by
the very same structural parameters identi￿ed by the model builder. Once this is done, the model
should then be able to provide the stable parameter estimates sought after by the econometrician
to reliably predict the outcomes of policy changes and other ￿ shocks￿ .
Lawson argues that the strategies used by Lucas, Sargent and others in response to the repeated
failures of estimated econometric relationships may be recast as the search for extrinsic and intrinsic
closures. These closures are the necessary conditions for identifying the (stochastic) event regulari-
ties presupposed by such relationships. Extrinsic closure requires isolating the relevant independent
or ￿ forcing￿variables from the dependent variable of interest. The Lucas policy invariance critique
and the responses to it are an example of the way in which a mispeci￿ed model is broadened to
include additional variables hitherto regarded as extrinsic to the model ￿either explicitly or implic-
itly under the ceteris paribus clause. Such variables are thus made endogenous to the model, in this
case the in￿ uence of expectations in the way suggested by the rational expectations hypothesis.
Lawson notes that intrinsic closures are also necessary to achieve reliable econometric relation-
ships in that the behaviour of the ￿ unit of analysis￿of the variables in question must be constant
over di⁄erent times, places and social settings. The search for intrinsic closure is re￿ ected in the
emphasis placed by the new classical economists on microfoundations and an invariant structure
upon which econometric relationships may be built. These microfoundations are provided by new
classical economists in the form of rational, optimising individuals in a choice-theoretic framework.
To recap, econometrics cannot succeed in providing reliable empirical generalisations without
such extrinsic and intrinsic closures. The problem then, according to Lawson, is that the closures
proposed by orthodox economists like Lucas and Sargent are derived from a false conception of
social reality as made up of event regularities. For the social and economic worlds are open rather
than closed such that ￿the system can rarely if ever be viewed as one of isolation ￿so suggesting
problems in satisfying the extrinsic condition for closure￿and ￿Once, furthermore it is allowed that
human agents are internally structured and complex and possess the capacity always to have acted
otherwise the whole framework appears to go by the board￿(ibid. 83).
Lawson concludes his piece on econometrics by referring to what he calls the atomistic and isola-
tionist fallacies which underpin regularity stochasticism in economics: ￿These are the suppositions
that all behaviour or aspects can in some form be given, or reduced to, a (crypto-) atomistic repre-
sentation and treated analytically as though e⁄ectively isolated from all other factors not explicitly
identi￿ed. It is under the in￿ uence of these fallacies that econometricians attempt repeatedly to
shore up the closure conditions. And in the limit the tendencies so set in train amount to the
search for systems so large that they exclude nothing and individuals so small that they include
nothing. This is the direction in which the familiar responses to econometric failure ultimately lead￿
(ibid. 84). For Lawson, the only viable alternative ￿is to posit an autonomous, structured, inten-
tional agent somewhere between the universe and the atom, that acts in a complexly structured,
fundamentally open, internally related and changing world￿(ibid. 84).
3.5 Economic theory
Formal economic theory, according to Lawson, faces similar problems to econometrics and he asserts
that the responses and adjustments within the mainstream to these problems are similarly doomed
to lead to a dead end. This is because they do not identify the real nature of the disorder. The
fundamental problem is that economic theory follows a deductivist methodology that, in turn, is
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Lawson notes the distinction often made by mainstream theorists between axioms and assump-
tions. Axioms are the most general behavioural statements or starting points that the theorist does
not seek to question. By contrast, assumptions are more speci￿c or concrete assertions consistent
with such axioms. For example, following Hahn (whom Lawson holds up as one of the few main-
stream theorists prepared to explicitly defend its methods) the assertion that more input is needed
to produce more output is an axiom whereas the speci￿c form of the production function (eg. that
it is Cobb-Douglas) counts as an assumption. Many substantive features of mainstream economic
theory are assumptions rather than axioms ￿for example, universal perfect competition, constant
returns to scale and perfect knowledge. These are not seen as essential to economic theorising,
rather they are viewed as ￿ sca⁄olding￿that can be removed later as progress is made in explaining
the economy. According to Hahn only individualism, some postulate regarding rationality, and
a commitment to the analysis of equilibrium states is essential to the mainstream (neoclassical)
theory project.
Lawson notes some recently proposed modi￿cations to the orthodox economic theory project and
explains how these have come about. For example, in place of rational individuals some theorists
have examined the outcomes of models which assume that individuals are rule following automata
while others have treated groups or social aggregates as if they were a single rational individual. The
commitment to single solution equilibrium states has mostly been abandoned in favour of multiple
model solutions; and whereas the mainstream used to prefer simplicity in model construction, the
new orthodoxy sees the recognition of complexity and more concrete empirical hypotheses, if not
as a virtue, then as a necessary evil. Advances in computer power have made it possible to embody
such complexity and empirical speci￿city in computer simulations. But according to Lawson, ￿Such
changes as have been occurring represent merely the latest set of manoeuvres aimed at prolonging
the life of an essentially misguided project. The nature of the proposed changes...are such that
they necessarily leave the project still incapable of dealing with its manifest problems. They do not
facilitate a theory capable of explaining real-world events or of assisting policy formulation￿(ibid.
90).
The reason for this is essentially the same as for the incapacity of econometrics to illuminate ad-
equately the real world: the orthodox theory project is built on inappropriate deductivist-positivist
foundations. In place of the regularity stochasticism of econometric models, formal economic the-
orising and models are characterised by regularity determinism. The empirical generalisations or
￿ laws￿sought after by econometricians are replaced by the axioms and assumptions of formal eco-
nomic theory and these are derived from the same types of intrinsic and extrinsic closures explained
above. The deductivist mode of reasoning is then relied upon to demonstrate the internal coherence
of the model, the existence of one or more equilibria (the familiar ￿ equilibrium proofs￿ ) and other
purely formal properties thereof.
According to Lawson, whereas orthodox economic theory is to some extent ￿ exible as regards the
content of its axioms and assumptions, the deductivist mode of reasoning is the most essential and
in￿ exible aspect thereof, ￿Given the revealed ￿ exibility of that project at the level of substantive
premises, including axioms as well as assumptions, and its apparent in￿ exibility at the level of its
mode of explanation, I suggest that an adherence to deductivism in the context of attempting to
understand social phenomena be recognised not merely as fundamental to, but actually constitutive
of, the ￿ economic theory￿project...I suggest that the mainstream ￿ theorising￿project be recognised
just as the uncritical adherence to, or persistence with, the deductivist mode of explanation in the
context of economics￿(ibid. 103).
203.6 Demi-regularities
If the ontology of orthodox economics, based on social atomism and methodological individualism,
is regarded as de￿cient, what speci￿c alternative conception does Lawson have in mind? In Part III
of Economics and Reality, Lawson examines alternative conceptions of social reality and modes of
explanation consistent with his version of transcendental realism. These are not new perspectives
and are familiar to other social scientists, particularly sociologists, working outside of mainstream
economics. Besides the distinction between open and closed systems referred to above, Lawson
conceives social reality as comprising intentional human beings and social structures functionally
dependent on human agency. These social structures are irreducible and thus not explicable as the
mechanistic sum or aggregate outcome of the actions of individuals. Lawson refers to the various
elements of these social structures such as the importance of habit and routinisation of human
behaviour, social rules, social relations and positions, and social systems (such as institutions) and
collectives (sets of people occupying particular positions in society). In this social setting, individ-
uals are seen as behaving according to a theory of situated rationality: ￿Not only are individuals￿
choices of actions conditioned by the situated options which they perceive, but also the individu-
als themselves, their expressions of their needs and motives, the manner in which their capacities
and capabilities have been moulded, their values and interests and so forth are conditioned by the
context of their birth and development￿(Lawson 1997: 187).
But how are the important and relevant social structures, powers and tendencies identi￿ed
by a transcendental realist? In the natural sciences, interventions in the form of experiments,
control groups and the like are used to discover the underlying causal mechanisms that produce
the empirical regularities isolated under experimental conditions. But if, as Lawson argues, strict
empirical regularities in open social contexts are the exception rather than the rule and if the
kinds of experimental interventions and controls used in the natural sciences are unavailable in
such social settings, then how is a social science like economics possible? Lawson￿ s version of
transcendental analysis relies on the presence of (surprisingly pervasive) partial, demi-regularities
or ￿ demi-regs￿as indicators of the possible causal mechanisms and structures in social settings.
Despite the potentially chaotic nature of open social systems, characterised as they are by so
many cross-cutting and countervailing factors, relatively stable partial regularities do emerge. Such
demi-regs are partial in that they are time and location speci￿c. Lawson gives various examples:
￿productivity growth in the UK over the last century has frequently been slower than that of most
other, otherwise comparable, industrial countries￿ ; ￿women look after children more often than
men do￿ ; ￿average unemployment rates in western industrial countries are higher in the 1990s than
in the 1960s￿and; ￿an increasing proportion of the world￿ s population lives in cities￿(ibid. 204 -
207).
Interesting demi-regs are contrastive in that, as these examples suggest, they are phrased as
direct or implied comparisons over time, gender or di⁄erent locations. Moreover, not all partial
regularities are interesting in the sense of stimulating further inquiry to ￿nd a satisfactory expla-
nation. Interesting demi-regs, according to Lawson, are those that are surprising, contradictory or
inconsistent with existing beliefs, expectations or theories (ibid. 210) ￿thus the partial regularity
that presently in the UK ￿on average more people go to church on a Sunday than on Tuesday￿
hardly quali￿es as an interesting demi-reg worthy of further investigation (ibid.211).
Contrastive demi-regs thus lead to hypotheses about the possible causal mechanisms generating
them. But the transcendental mode of reasoning required here is not induction or deduction but
retroduction ￿reasoning directed at identifying the factors responsible for the demi-reg in question.
Lawson notes that it is di¢ cult to be more speci￿c: ￿Not much can be said about this process
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or metaphor and to draw heavily on the investigator￿ s perspective, beliefs and experience￿(ibid.
212). Also noteworthy is that deduction necessarily plays a role in assessing the chosen causal
hypotheses ￿if the hypotheses were true, what empirical consequences would logically follow from
their operation? Further investigation would entail checking to see if the conditions under which
the causal mechanism is operative are present and whether such empirical results are actually in
evidence in various settings where this can be established.
3.7 Alternatives to mainstream economics
Alternative traditions of economic thought to the orthodoxy are referred to approvingly by Lawson
to the extent that they embody, to varying degrees, essential elements of the critical realist perspec-
tive: ￿It turned out that it is mostly (but not exclusively) economists regarded as non-mainstream
who have re￿ ected on these matters to any signi￿cant extent. I refer here to the likes of Keynes,
Hayek, Marx, Dobb, Veblen, Marshall, Smith, Shackle, Menger, Boulding, and Kaldor. In conse-
quence, it is their writings that provided much of the initial background material for the central
argument set out below...In fact they contribute rather more than this. In one form or another,
they already express many of the fundamental tenets of the basic thesis￿(Lawson 1997: xii). Hayek
and Menger are given some attention here and the points of similarity and contrast of their ideas
to Lawson￿ s interpretation of critical and transcendental realism is explained in more detail (ibid.
113-151). However, the focus of Economics and Reality is a critique of the mainstream and an
outline of his realist perspective, rather than a sustained examination of non-mainstream thinking.
Heterodox thinking in economics and other alternative realist views of society are explored fur-
ther in Lawson￿ s later book, Reorienting Economics (Lawson 2003). Keynes and post-Keynesianism,
institutional economics and feminism are explored in greater depth in this book (ibid. 165-244).
Lawson argues that these alternative explanations of social reality all have something in common
and that they can, indeed should, fall under the umbrella of critical/transcendental realism and
analysis as a unifying framework for social explanation. Besides the analytical argument regarding
these commonalities there is also a strategic argument for this move. Strategically, to change main-
stream thinking and to reorient economics by taking the ￿ ontological turn￿suggested by critical
realist analysis, this needs a united opposition and a coherent alternative framework. For Lawson,
building on his arguments in his earlier book, gives various reasons why and how the mainstream or-
thodoxy (also called the ￿ economics academy￿in this book) has become so powerful and entrenched.
Each of the various heterodox positions has something to o⁄er as an alternative to the mainstream
but are separately unlikely to persuade the economics academy to change its ways in the desired
direction ￿a case of ￿ united we stand, divided we fall￿ .
In this book (as well as his earlier book), Lawson￿ s message is that only an ￿ ontological turn￿
that grasps social reality along something like the transcendental realist lines explained above can
save mainstream economics from the predicament it ￿nds itself in. To paraphrase his argument
about this predicament, in the opening chapter Lawson writes four theses on the state of modern
economics as follows:
1. Academic economics is currently dominated to a very signi￿cant degree by a mainstream
tradition or orthodoxy, the essence of which is an insistence on methods of mathematical-
deductivist modelling.
2. This mainstream project is not in too healthy a condition.
223. A major reason why the mainstream project performs so poorly is that mathematical-deductivist
methods are being applied in conditions for which they are not appropriate.
4. Despite ambitions to the contrary, the modern mainstream project mostly serves to constrain
economics from realising its (nevertheless real) potential to be not only explanatorily powerful,
but scienti￿c in the sense of natural science. (ibid. 3)
Although Lawson regards each of these four theses as largely self-evident, they are explained
and defended by extending the arguments outlined in his earlier book. In defending the ￿rst
thesis, Lawson refers to various economists ￿including theorists and methodologists ￿who have
described the formal model building approach in economics and its reliance on mathematics and
have expressed their concerns about it (ibid. 3￿ 8, 165￿ 183). Lawson also gives an interesting
historical explanation of the mathematising tendency in modern mainstream economics, suggesting
that the seductive power of the elegance, simplicity, and rigour of mathematics has led to its
seemingly unshakeable hold over economic theory ￿such that orthodox economics is seen as virtually
synonymous with formal mathematical modelling and its deductivist methodology (ibid. 247￿ 282,
see also Colander 2001).
The second thesis is less self-evident and is a more problematic link in Lawson￿ s argument. First,
although there are many economists who agree with Lawson that there is something badly wrong
with mainstream economic theorising and practice, there are others with very divergent beliefs in
this regard. Many believe that orthodox economics is doing perfectly well and has shown itself to
be highly successful ￿both in its general predictions and as an explanatory guide to policymakers.
There are still others who admit that the record has not been that great in this regard but that it
is continually improving with new advances in mathematical and econometric techniques. Second,
the mainstream would not be the mainstream if the majority of economists did not have faith in
the project. Here there is an element of irony in Lawson￿ s argument about the way in which social
structures reproduce themselves. The mainstream academic orthodoxy is perhaps a good example of
a social tendency that manages to reproduce itself and manufacture stratagems to de￿ ect criticism
(including that of critical realism), thereby becoming resistant to change and thus self-perpetuating
(see also the conclusion to section 4 below).
The third thesis depends crucially on how far one is prepared to accept that the formal de-
ductivist model building approach and its reliance on mathematics is inappropriate when applied
to the social realm; and accepting the fourth thesis requires an evaluation of possible alternatives
to the mainstream, especially those in which the elements of transcendental realism shine through
more strongly.
4 M￿ki and Lawson compared: a preliminary evaluation
The main aim of this review to this point has been to summarize and clarify M￿ki￿ s and Lawson￿ s
approaches to the connection between economics, realism and reality as outlined in sections 2 and 3
respectively. An accurate summary of their respective positions is necessary before more evaluative
and critical comments are made thereon, if only to avoid the charge that such criticisms mis￿re
because they are based on a misconception or mistaken representations of their ideas and arguments,
as in M￿ki￿ s retort to Hausman referred to in the introduction. Drawing on the above, this section
extracts the main points of agreement and di⁄erences between M￿ki and Lawson and suggests a
preliminary evaluation of their individual contributions. A more comprehensive critical evaluation
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enough here to stimulate and carry forward the debate on some of the more essential issues.
4.1 Similarities
As pointed out in the introduction, despite the super￿cial appearance of similarity, the realism
projects of M￿ki and Lawson di⁄er so fundamentally that they are best thought of as advancing
separate projects. However, they do share the same broad concern with questions of ontology and
the metaphysics of economic theory and make such issues the focus of their philosophical analysis.
This sets them apart from the prior emphasis in the methodology of economics on epistemological
concerns. As noted in the introduction, during the 1970s and for much of the 1980s, the methodology
of economics was preoccupied with issues surrounding the appraisal of economic theories. The
search for a demarcation principle to separate science from non-scienti￿c endeavours and to serve
as a rational basis for choosing between competing theories was the order of the day. In particular,
the ideas of Popper and Lakatos, developed with the natural sciences in mind, were applied perhaps
uncritically to economics. The overriding concern was to see to what extent economic theorising
conformed to the dictates of falsi￿cationism and the methodology of scienti￿c research programmes
￿ with the implied concern as to whether or not economics could be legitimately regarded as
a science. In their analyses of the ontological presuppositions of economics, M￿ki and Lawson
have been leading contributors to the break up of the ￿ Popperian dominance￿in the philosophy of
economics.
4.2 Di⁄erences
Five aspects of the projects advanced by M￿ki and Lawson are selected here for comparison. There
are no doubt other di⁄erences as well, but the following appear to the author to be the most striking:
critical content and scope; approach to abstraction in economic theorising; realism vs realisticness
and; signi￿cance and use of dialectics.
4.2.1 Critical content and scope
The di⁄erence in critical content and scope of their respective projects is the most obvious and
important di⁄erence. M￿ki￿ s approach is much more neutral than Lawson￿ s as regards criticism
of mainstream economics. M￿ki￿ s project is to examine economics as an interesting case study for
analytical philosophy. His project has had two main related aims in mind. The ￿rst is to see to
what extent the di⁄erent schools of thought in economic theory are compatible with realism. M￿ki
shows that most areas of economics can be interpreted along realist lines or at least are consistent
with certain elements of realism. Against the criticism that only rather weak versions of realism
are used in such studies, M￿ki argues that it is necessary to establish this ￿rst before scrutinising
the content of particular economic theories for their coherence against stricter versions of realism.
His position is that the question of whether the entities postulated by economic theory might exist
and whether such theories might be true logically precede the questions of whether the entities do
exist and that the theories are true. To become entangled in arguments about the latter before the
former issues have been resolved is simply to put the cart before the horse. M￿ki￿ s second aim is to
exploit the opportunity for the philosophical tasks of conceptual and terminological clari￿cation.
An important aspect of this analysis is the dialectical interaction between the subject matter of
economics and the conceptual resources of philosophy - for example, in showing how the notion
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economics such as the mind-dependent existence of many of its objects (see more below).
Lawson, by contrast, is not content with a purely conceptual analysis aimed at the terminolog-
ical clari￿cation and classi￿cation of economic theory or to what extent the di⁄erent theories and
methodological pronouncements are consistent with weak versions of philosophical realism. Lawson
is critical of what he regards as mainstream economics, from the perspective of transcendental re-
alism and is thus prescriptive as well as descriptive of economic theory and practice. For example,
as explained in section 2.2, M￿ki ￿nds important elements of Friedman￿ s methodological position
consistent with realism (concluding that he is an ontological, referential, representational and veris-
tic theorist but a methodological non-realist). M￿ki concedes that his interpretation of Friedman
as a realist is somewhat surprising (given the traditional idea of Friedman￿ s position as the classic
statement of instrumentalism in economics) and that quite a weak version of realism is being enter-
tained thereto, as revealed in his remark that ￿ Even Friedman turns out to be a realist in the end!￿
M￿ki￿ s criticism of Friedman is more along the lines of the inconsistencies and conceptual confusions
uncovered by a close philosophical analysis of his ideas rather than that he is a non-realist in some
respects (see Boylan and O￿Gorman 1995: 117). Lawson, by sharp contrast, ￿nds Friedman￿ s ￿ as
if￿method together with his positivist interpretation and almost exclusive emphasis on the testing
of the predictions of economic theory to be de￿cient from a critical realist perspective (ibid. 108 ￿
112).
Another way of explaining their di⁄erences as regards the critical content and scope of their
varied contributions is to use Lawson￿ s distinction between (social scienti￿c and social philosophical)
ontological analysis and opology. Lawson notes that opological studies can reveal inconsistencies
between the ontological presuppositions and other beliefs held by a theorist and, via a dialectical
process (see also below), may help to reconcile them. Lawson does not engage in any such studies
himself but refers approvingly to other authors thereof. As explained in section 3.1, Lawson sees
studies of this sort as interesting but not going far enough. Much more important is social scienti￿c
and social philosophical ontology which, for Lawson, has the potential to uncover the ￿ basic structure
of social reality￿ . By contrast, an important part of M￿ki￿ s work is just such opological studies of
particular theorists, ￿to look at the actual theories, methods, and meta-theoretical views held by
practicing economists, and to see whether there are plausible interpretations and reconstructions
that would be consistent with versions of realism￿(M￿ki 2002: 91). Thus for critical realists like
Lawson, social philosophical ontology along the lines of transcendental realism can give us insights
into the basic ontological categories of experience which, in turn, conditions and gives direction to
the closer empirical studies of social scienti￿c ontology (see section 3.1). M￿ki, by contrast, does
not speculate on the nature of social reality in the way Lawson does and con￿nes this part of his
work to opology rather than ontological theorising as such.
4.2.2 Abstraction in economic theorising
A more speci￿c di⁄erence in their respective approaches is the way in which they view the role of
abstraction in economic theorising. Both Lawson and M￿ki seem to agree that such abstraction
necessarily involves a degree of simpli￿cation of a complex social reality but they di⁄er markedly as
to the way in which this should be done. As noted in section 2.3, M￿ki asserts that since all theories
simplify, all theories are necessarily false and hence economics should not be criticised too harshly
on this score. Simpli￿cations and falsehoods are a necessary and desirable feature of economic
theorising, in order to isolate a particular aspect or region of social reality. M￿ki (1992: 328 - 324)
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￿ idealisation￿(in economics as in the natural sciences). ￿ Omission￿is the intentional leaving out of
variables believed to have no or only a negligible in￿ uence on the particular subsystem of reality
isolated for further analysis, as in partial equilibrium analysis of a particular market (say coal) where
the in￿ uence of supply and demand conditions in most other markets is ignored (lemons, haircuts,
gold, and primary school education but not close substitutes like oil and gas). ￿ Idealisation￿ , by
contrast, is the deliberate distortion of the variables that are part of the selected subsystem by
giving them an extreme characterisation that is not found in reality, for example ￿rms operating
under conditions of universal perfect competition. In economics both omission and idealisation are
accomplished by means of assumptions rather than the interventions and manipulations carried out
in the natural sciences using the experimental method. Although ￿ctitious such assumptions may
aid the pursuit of truth as heuristic devices whereby the restrictions implied by the assumptions
can be relaxed in various ways, providing successively better approximations to reality although, as
noted by M￿ki, this process is generally not taken very far in economics. Before noting Lawson￿ s
criticisms, a more recent extension of M￿ki￿ s ideas to the connection between isolations, models
and experiments is examined. This usefully serves a dual purpose as it also provides an entry to
the debate concerning realism vs realisticness in economics.
M￿ki (2005) suggests that models are representations of something ￿this ￿ something￿could be
reality itself but they could just as easily be representative of theories or data - so we can have
material models, theoretical models and empirical models. Models are thus intended as representa-
tives: ￿Another way of putting this is to say that models serve as ￿ substitute systems￿of the target
system they represent. They are substitute systems in the sense that one does not directly examine
the target systems, rather one focuses on the properties and behaviour of the representatives as
substitutes of the targets￿(ibid. 304). The target system is too complex to be understood in its
entirety so a simpler model is constructed to explore it: ￿Theoretical practice in economics is in line
with this notion of representation: ￿ let us examine what happens in this model￿thereby hoping to
gain some insight into the ￿ whys￿and ￿ hows￿of what happens in the real world￿(ibid.). However,
not just any substitute system will do, the representative model must resemble the target system
adequately where ￿ adequately￿depends on the intention or purpose of the model.
Many variants of economic models may thus be seen, M￿ki suggests, as the ￿ laboratories of
economic theorists￿in which ￿ thought experiments￿replace the ￿ material experiments￿of the natural
sciences. In the former ￿ theoretical isolations￿are achieved by means of assumptions and these do
the work of the material manipulations and causal isolations of the latter. M￿ki views this as a
necessary evil and even as a desirable feature of theorising in economics: ￿Assumptions play a key
role in the construction of theoretical models as substitute systems. Such idealising assumptions, if
interpreted as statements about the real world, are characteristically false. Yet they are necessary
for e⁄ecting the required theoretical isolations. Unrealistic assumptions are the indispensable tools
of the economic theorist￿(ibid. 308). However, as noted at the end of the preceding paragraph, the
models based on such assumptions cannot be unrealistic in an unquali￿ed sense ￿they must resemble
the target system in some way, depending on the purpose of the model: ￿The issue of resemblance is
the hottest methodological issue in and about theoretical economics. Models and their assumptions
are being criticised for being unrealistic and defended as su¢ ciently realistic or inconsequentially
unrealistic...The traditional complaint is that the representatives do not su¢ ciently resemble what
they represent, and that the gap between the two is ignored by treating the substitute systems as
if they were the real system￿(ibid. 309).
M￿ki elaborates further on what the issue of resemblance implies if we take a model as repre-
26sentative of some aspect of the external ￿ maxi-world￿or ￿ economy in the wild￿by suggesting three
possibilities: the tightly constrained and orderly ￿ mini-world￿of the model resembles the relevant
aspects of the more chaotic non-isolated ￿ maxi-world or; it resembles what would happen in the
real world if the isolations of the model were carried out or; the isolations of the model capture real
causal powers and mechanisms which resemble those at work in reality. Although M￿ki explicitly
favours the third conjecture it is instructive to note that, in keeping with his mostly descriptive
and neutral interpretation of economic theorising within the framework of philosophical realism,
he does not elaborate any further on whether such models do in fact capture the essential causal
elements and are indeed realistic in this sense: ￿But there are models that again do play a role
in judging these options: the options involve metaphysical conjectures, and these conjectures are
described in terms of metaphysical models of the basic constitution of the social world￿and in a
footnote thereto ￿The very idea of model isolation (whether theoretical or experimental) is meta-
physically su¢ ciently neutral to allow for all three metaphysical models￿(ibid. 311 and fn 5, 314).
The question of what the basic constitution of the social world really is and whether conventional
economic theory and modelling captures it adequately is left hanging. It is precisely on these and
related issues of representation and resemblance that Lawson and M￿ki part company.
In short, Lawson argues that M￿ki￿ s idea of abstraction as a ￿ method of isolation￿as applied
to economics (either to the extent that it is being recommended or as simply descriptive of what
economists do) is incapable of capturing the essential causal features of economic reality. Lawson
notes M￿ki￿ s distinction between internal and external isolations that close o⁄ a system of relations
between selected variables. According to Lawson, by using ￿ techniques of isolation￿such as ￿ omission
and idealization￿M￿ki thus presents an interpretation of the notion of successive approximation (to
reality) which is thereby ￿able to accommodate a good deal of contemporary orthodox economics￿
(Lawson 1997: 132). Lawson criticises M￿ki￿ s use of the method of isolation as inappropriate in a
social context: ￿However, if...the social world is not usefully viewed as crypto-atomistic and the
various social phenomena cannot be combined mechanically, then, just as contemporary orthodox
economics is largely irrelevant, so, as a social scienti￿c device, must be any such ￿ method of isolation￿
￿(ibid.).
Lawson has a very di⁄erent view of social phenomena and of abstraction in the social context
which he argues does not involve such techniques of omission and idealization and thereby avoids
theoretical simpli￿cations leading to no more than arti￿cial, convenient ￿ctions. First, Lawson
shares the critical realist view of social phenomena as being strati￿ed with higher strata emerging
from lower strata. Such strata thus possess the properties of emergence and rootedness ￿ the
higher strata are dependent for their existence on the lower strata from which they emerge but
they are not reducible thereto. Each strata has its own entities, nature, powers, tendencies and
real existence that cannot be satisfactorily explained in terms of the entities, causal powers and
tendencies of the lower strata. Another way of putting this is that the causal mechanisms of a
particular stratum combine chemically rather than mechanically to produce an emergent outcome
that is qualitatively di⁄erent to the mechanical additive sum of its constituent parts. Second, for
Lawson abstraction focuses on particular aspects of some social phenomenon of interest to the
temporary neglect of other aspects. Moreover, abstraction also takes place at the level of selecting
from the possible causal mechanisms that might give rise to such phenomena ￿a form of reasoning
Lawson calls retroduction. On the realist view such abstraction must identify social phenomena and
structures which exist in reality and should not be used merely to simplify matters as a contrivance
in the mind of the theorist in which the main aim is to explore the formal properties of some
model. Crucially, for Lawson, abstraction is context speci￿c and must never lose sight of the social
27background against which these aspects are abstracted from and brought to the fore. This is in
contrast to M￿ki￿ s method of isolation which, Lawson argues, uses the techniques of omission and
idealization to construct economic models in which the social context or background ceases to exist.
Lawson uses the analogy of a football or hockey game to make his point clear. Lawson suggests
that using the method of isolation to understand such an activity is like isolating an individual
(atomistic) player and omitting the other players and their interactions (the background context).
One might be able to correlate certain actions of the individual player with certain motions of the
football or puck and even, perhaps, be able to predict on the basis of such correlations whether or
not a touchdown or goal might be scored. However, from the perspective of a realist like Lawson,
such an analysis is de￿cient in being unable to properly understand and explain key aspects of the
game. A satisfactory realist explanation of such social activities requires a form of abstraction that
recognizes the openness of social systems (both extrinsically in recognizing the interactions between
the players and intrinsically as regards the motivations of the individual players) and the contextual
background when temporarily focussing on a particular aspect thereof (ibid. 227 ￿234).
4.2.3 Realism vs realisticness
The issues raised above concerning the di⁄erences between M￿ki and Lawson in their approach to
abstraction in economic theorising suggest an underlying reason for the many contrasts between
their respective projects. The reason is that M￿ki is concerned with the broad issue of the connection
between realism and economics whereas Lawson￿ s focus is on the actual content of economic theories
￿especially their realisticness or lack thereof. In M￿ki￿ s terms, as outlined in section 2.2, realisticness
is about the way in which economic theories represent the world and is thus a property that adheres,
or does not adhere, to a particular theory. Although the two terms are obviously connected in
various ways, realism is a broader thesis than realisticness ￿it is a metatheoretical perspective or a
￿ theory of theories￿ . As noted by M￿ki, a theoretical representation can be called realistic in many
di⁄erent senses ￿for example, if it is about the real world, observables, essentials, truth, or if the
theory is plausible, successful empirically or practically useful (see M￿ki 1994). Also, as explained
above with regard to abstraction and isolation in economics, M￿ki (2005) seems to suggest that
there is a connection between realisticness and his concept of resemblance although he does not use
this exact terminology in his explanation thereof. For example, he notes that economic models are
representative of some target subsystem under investigation and that such models, as substitute
systems, should resemble their target. M￿ki does not say explicitly how this should be achieved
beyond stating that this depends on the purpose or aim of the model. However, where the target
subsystem is some aspect or region of the real world (rather than another theory or model with the
aim of purely formal exploration of its properties), it would appear that to resemble such a target
the model would have to be realistic in some of the ways he suggests as regards his earlier de￿nition
of and arguments concerning ￿ realisticness￿(M￿ki 1994; 2005).
To generalise M￿ki￿ s distinction between realism and realisticness, someone who believes that
economic theories must or should include unrealistic assumptions is not necessarily a non-realist in
the broader sense of philosophical realism: ￿A realist economist is permitted, indeed required, to
use unrealistic assumptions in order to isolate what are believed to be the most essential features
in a complex situation...To count as a minimal realist, an economist is required to believe that
economic reality is unconstituted by his or her representations of it and that whatever truth value
those representations have is independent of his or her or anybody else￿ s opinions of it￿(M￿ki 1994:
248).
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mal realists￿in this sense, his concern is that orthodox economic theory is unrealistic in not repre-
senting the way things really are in that it does not refer factually and does not latch onto what is
essential in the social domain (as opposed to that which is the most general). According to Lawson,
the deductivist formal model building methodology of mainstream economics is built upon a ￿ awed
conception of reality as composed of empirical event regularities (see section 3.2). In turn, this
leads orthodox theory into untenable ￿ctional representations of the economy via techniques of iso-
lation such as omission and idealization. This means, for Lawson, that such theorising is unable to
explain what is really going on in the social domain, that is, the structures, powers and tendencies
underlying and producing the surface empirical phenomena. Lawson￿ s standpoint is that economic
theory should strive for true explanations of social phenomena, hence Lawson is a methodological
realist in this respect. Moreover, Lawson believes that economics can be a genuine science with
such explanatory powers if it reorients itself along the lines of transcendental realism.
Besides his criticisms of what he regards as the mainstream, Lawson has also criticized alter-
native projects in economics. While someone like Friedman might be regarded as an easy target
for Lawson￿ s criticisms (see above in this section under critical content and scope), Lawson has
also tackled less obvious economists such as Menger and Hayek who are themselves also critical
of certain aspects of what they see as the mainstream. By contrast, M￿ki has provided a realist
interpretation of Austrian economics and refers explicitly to Menger￿ s contributions in this regard
(see section 2.1). Thus a further illustration of the way Lawson and M￿ki di⁄er as regards theorising
in economics and the realism vs realisticness issue can be seen in their interpretations of aspects of
Austrian economics.
M￿ki, as explained in section 2.1, sees Austrian economics as consistent with (minimal) criteria
of scienti￿c realism. Starting o⁄ his reconstruction of Austrian explanation (M￿ki 1990: 320) M￿ki
refers to Menger￿ s distinction between Erkenntnis (cognition) and Verstandnis (understanding)
as indicative of the realist premise underlying Austrian explanation. M￿ki interprets Menger￿ s
emphasis on Verstandnis as the true aim of economics as an example of explanatory redescription.
M￿ki interprets Erkenntnis as limited to the description of surface empirical phenomena while
Verstandnis goes beneath the surface and redescribes such phenomena in terms of the true nature
or essence of the objects that produce these empirical results.
M￿ki also refers to the key distinction made by Menger and von Mises between ￿ theory￿and
￿ history￿(for example, in the Methodenstreit with the German historical school) in which theory
takes centre stage to play the primary role in scienti￿c explanation. According to M￿ki, the Austrian
emphasis on theory shows a realist orientation in the sense of explanatory redescription as, ￿It is only
by means of the conceptual resources of a theory ￿not being reducible to the observational language
of empirical facts and generalisations ￿that empirical facts can be redescribed in a way which reveals
what those facts really are￿(ibid. 321). He also suggests that Austrian economists identify social
entities as being nothing but aggregates of meaningful individual actions (the ￿ aggregative principle￿ )
and to be the unintended consequences of such actions (the ￿ causal principle￿ ). According to M￿ki,
such explanatory identi￿cations further reveal the underlying realist orientation of Austrians like
Menger, von Mises and Hayek. Moreover, M￿ki notes Menger￿ s criticism of classical economics as
being unable to give a uniform explanation for prices of both factor services and consumer goods.
He interprets Menger￿ s striving towards a uniform theory in which all phenomena of value are
explained according to the same principles as an example of ontological uni￿cation ￿a hallmark of
scienti￿c realism.
Lawson, however, ￿nds much of Menger￿ s methodological pronouncements to be de￿cient from a
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a transcendental realist position at least) by observing that strict regularities of actual events rarely
occur in either the social or natural worlds. However, Menger argues that exact laws based on event
regularities are possible in economics nevertheless. These regularities are not constant conjunctions
of actual empirical phenomena but regularities based on the theoretically derived simplest elements
of social reality (such as the assumptions of omniscience and infallibility and that human beings are
purely economically motivated). Menger argues that just as theories in the natural sciences make
use of simplifying idealisations such as pure alcohol or pure copper (even though such elements do
not actually exist in the real world, only in a laboratory), so can theories in the social sciences
derive exact laws using similarly ￿ctitious idealising assumptions.
Lawson concedes that Menger￿ s analysis is not without some insight into social reality: ￿His
exact laws can correspond to something real, wherein a stable mechanism or tendency is acting in
relative isolation￿ . However, Lawson argues that the problem with Menger￿ s account, even when
applied to the natural world, is that it fails to capture the entirety of a mechanism￿ s essential way
of acting. Lawson extends the example of pure copper to note that science is not concerned with
￿nding event regularities associated with the metal￿ s pure state as such. Rather the aim of science
is to uncover the (transfactual) atomic structure that gives all copper its characteristic properties,
powers and tendencies under particular conditions. Lawson argues further that in this respect
Menger￿ s idealising ￿ctions in economics are qualitatively di⁄erent to the typical idealisations of
the natural sciences: ￿And while copper￿ s ideal electronic structure is real and accounts for copper￿ s
power to conduct electricity, conceptions of omniscience or infallibility do not express structures or
powers possessed by any human. They are not powers which are possessed but may or may not
be exercised, and if exercised as tendencies may be in play unrealised because of countervailing
metaphorical blinkers or whatever. They are not real human powers at all￿(Lawson 1997: 126).
To rephrase the contrasting views in this illustration, it is apparent that M￿ki can accommodate
Austrian economics under a weak version of philosophical realism whereby some of the more speci￿c
ways in which their theories represent the real world are ignored or glossed over. For M￿ki, Austrian
economics is consistent with philosophical realism as it bears the hallmarks of explanatory redescrip-
tion and ontological uni￿cation, commonsense, methodological, veristic, and referential realism (see
sections 2.1 and 2.2). M￿ki also argues that the Austrians are representational realists to the extent
that their theory represents the ￿rm in a particular way (as the embodiment of entrepreneurship)
which is held to be a true representation capturing its essential features. On the other hand, the
Austrian representation of the ￿rm is unrealistic in that it ignores the organisational structure and
managerial decision-making aspects thereof and sees the ￿rm as an abstract entity coordinating a
competitive market process ￿a representation which in these respects does not resemble observed
business ￿rms. For Lawson, the fact that Austrian economics may be consistent with aspects of
commonsense, methodological, referential and veristic realism does not ensure that the way it rep-
resents the world is adequately realistic. From a critical realist position such as Lawson￿ s, the meat
of the issue is precisely how Austrian theorising represents the particular target subsystems of social
reality and whether it provides an adequate resemblance thereof. Lawson might not object to the
idea that the Austrian representation of the ￿rm captures an essential entrepreneurial aspect of its
nature and may thus be regarded as realistic in this respect. However, it is evident from Lawson￿ s
account of Menger￿ s approach to theory that he ￿nds idealising representations depicting individu-
als as ￿ omniscient￿and ￿ infallible￿to be a gross distortion of social reality in which the ￿ctions being
entertained are incapable of providing a satisfactory explanation of how the world really operates.
304.2.4 Dialectics
In the introduction to M￿ki￿ s work it was noted that he describes his realism project as dialectical,
hence the label ￿ dialectical realism￿was suggested as a broad classi￿cation thereof (see section 2.1).
Lawson, at various stages in his explanation of ontological analysis (see section 3.1), also refers to
certain aspects thereof as ￿ dialectical￿ . However, it is apparent from the way in which this term
is used by the two authors that they impart very di⁄erent meanings thereto and to its role and
signi￿cance in their respective projects. Due to the signi￿cance and development of this concept
in critical realism, especially via Bhaskar (from its origins in Hegel and materialist reworking by
Marx), it makes sense to consider the in￿ uence of dialectics in Lawson￿ s realist project ￿rst before
considering its meaning and role in M￿ki￿ s work.
Although Lawson occasionally uses the terms ￿ dialectics￿and ￿ dialectical￿they do not get much
of the limelight and are not emphasized as a key aspect of his critical realist approach. In none
of his publications reviewed here are these terms explained in any depth ￿it is left to the reader
to infer what is meant in the speci￿c context of the discussion. This is intriguing given Lawson￿ s
acknowledged intellectual debt to Bhaskar who, as the inventor of critical realism, came to regard
dialectics as essential to it. Indeed, with the publication of his later book Dialectic: The Pulse of
Freedom, Bhaskar sought to systematize and extend the concept in an all-encompassing way (see
Bhaskar 1993, Collier 2002). In any event the concept has not been neglected by some contributors
to the critical realism project, especially those with a leaning towards Marxist and radical schools
of thought. For this group it is not far o⁄ the mark to say that a version of Marx￿ s dialectics
is a (if not the) key ingredient of critical realism ￿it is the yeast that allows the classical realist
dough to rise and become bread: ￿...the materialist dialectics of the classical Marxist tradition,
though enriched by the ontological insights of critical realism, is nonetheless indispensable to critical
realism￿(Creaven 2002: 131).
Before examining Lawson￿ s use of this slippery term a more general description of its di⁄er-
ent meanings is thus in order. For critical realists in￿ uenced by Marx the most important meaning
of ￿ dialectical￿is its reference to the actual presence of a real process at work in the world, the
essence of which, in some sense, is a pattern of contradictions and progress via the resolution of
such contradictions. The basic idea of dialectical materialism is thus of a social system or totality
(thesis), containing within it antagonistic contradictions which are a source of con￿ ict (antithesis),
and leading to a transformation of the system thereby resolving these contradictions (synthesis).
The dialectical process does not end with this synthesis - the new system will develop its own contra-
dictions and the process is one of ongoing con￿ ict, change and transformation. Such contradictions
are seen as a structural feature of a social system and, signi￿cantly, are internal to the system in
that they are recognised as problematic not just by external critics but by those within the system.
As regards capitalism the standard examples include (prevailing and periodic) crises in the form of
stagnation, severe contractions in output, high levels of unemployment, highly unequal distribution
in income and wealth, and environmental disasters: ￿Contradiction in this sense is the fundamental
concept of Marx￿ s political philosophy, and is what enables him to avoid the utopianism of every
other radical political thinker. We ￿ght capitalism, not because we have a view from nowhere and
can see what the best society for human beings would be, but because capitalism has contradictions
which we can see from inside it, which hurt the people inside it, and which could be resolved with
the resources produced by it, but only by its abolition￿(Collier 2002: 156).
Besides such structural contradictions, Collier identi￿es two other forms of contradiction
which he also attributes as having their origins in Marx: ￿ inversions￿and ￿ Colletti contradictions￿ .
Inversions capture the idea that social systems produce certain outcomes that are the opposite of
31what is deemed desirable or what might be expected. In this respect there is often an ironic twist to
such contradictions. For example, in a capitalist system alienation is the result when the product
comes to dominate the producer. Another example is when living labour (workers) are dominated
by dead labour (capital) revealing the ￿paradox that the most powerful instrument for reducing
labour-time su⁄ers a dialectical inversion and becomes the most unfailing means for turning the
whole lifetime of the worker and his family into labour-time at capital￿ s disposal￿(Marx 1976: 532,
quoted in Collier 2003: 157).
Colletti contradictions are apparent where there is a con￿ ict between appearances and
social realities. As an example, money appears to be neutral in the sense that its transfer from
one person to another is regarded as voluntary and therefore not harmful to either whereas in
reality it is a form of power over the labour of others (Collier 2003: 158). At a more general level,
the smooth functioning of complex societies like capitalism requires the appearance of harmony,
cooperation and mutual advantage which mask an underlying con￿ ict and power struggle between
antagonistic groups (eg. class struggle, the proclaimed bene￿ts of free trade vs the realities of
colonialism/imperialism etc).
Structural contradictions, inversions and Colletti contradictions all have their origins in
Marx and were identi￿ed as such by Bhaskar before his Dialectic. In his earlier work, Bhaskar also
identi￿es other forms of dialectics including ￿ methodological￿dialectics and what Collier calls Edgley
contradictions (named after its originator, Roy Edgley). Neither of these, according to Collier, can
be attributed convincingly to Marx however. Methodological or epistemological dialectics, as these
labels imply, move away from materialist dialectical processes that may or may not be at work
in some area of social reality to the idea of dialectical logic as ￿skill in organising concepts￿ or
￿the art of thinking the coincidence of distinctions and connections￿(Collier 2002: 157; Bhaskar
1989). Collier argues that of greater signi￿cance, from a critical realist perspective, are Edgley
contradictions in that they suggest a way in which logical contradictions can exist in social reality:
people￿ s opinions are part of reality, people￿ s opinions may logically contradict each other, ergo
logical contradictions are part of social reality. Moreover, such contradictions are essential to
critical realism because they allow entry to explanatory critiques of the society containing such
contradictions with a view to its transformation: ￿In the central case of an explanatory critique,
the social science which carries out the critique shows that an opinion about a society is prevalent
in that society and is false; furthermore that its prevalence is no accident, but is generated by the
structures of that society and is necessary to the smooth running of that society. To show all this is
not just to criticise the false opinions, but to criticise the society and, other things being equal, to
motivate the transformation of that society into one which will not necessitate falsehoods￿(Collier
2002: 158).
To summarise the various meanings of dialectics and dialectical thus far there are struc-
tural contradictions, inversions, and Colletti contradictions which (arguably) have their fragmented
origins in Marx￿ s dialectical materialism (Marx 1976; Bhaskar 1979, 1987, 1989). Then there are
Edgley contradictions (Edgley 1976/1998; Bhaskar 1987) which do not have their origin in Marx.
All four meanings refer to a real process at work, or an ontological aspect of, the social domain.
Both Colletti and Edgley contradictions also (arguably) contain an element of logical contradiction
alongside their description of social contradictions (Collier 2002: 158). According to Collier, all
four are (or can be) of valuable service to critical realism and should be retained as such. Less
clear is the status of methodological dialectics in critical realism, perhaps due to scepticism about
whether it is a true description or genuine element of Marx￿ s materialist dialectics (despite Marx￿ s
own references to and use of the term). More generally, perhaps, because it involves a shift of
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While methodological dialectics may have an ambiguous status amongst some critical real-
ists, Collier has no hesitation in condemning what he sees as the two cardinal errors of dialecticians.
The ￿rst error is to trivialise dialectics by universalising the concept of contradiction such that it
loses the more concrete and practical application it carries in Marx￿ s materialist dialectic (for
example, Lenin￿ s inclusion of plus and minus signs and Mao￿ s inclusion of all di⁄erences as contra-
dictions). Here Collier also criticises Bhaskar￿ s Dialectic for extending the concept of contradiction
to denote ￿ any kind of dissonance, strain or tension￿and for allowing certain phenomena without
contradictions (unspeci￿ed by Bhaskar) to be classed as dialectical (Collier 2002: 162-163). The
second error is to deny the formal logic of non-contradiction that two inconsistent propositions
cannot both be true. Structural contradictions, inversions, Colletti contradictions, and Edgley
contradictions as explained above can all be described consistently without breaking the rules of
formal logic (such as the laws of identity and transitivity of identity). Allowing statements to assert
logically inconsistent propositions thwarts any progress of knowledge. In any event, Collier argues
that they are unnecessary because formal logic does not rule out any ontological position about
reality as mistakenly supposed by some dialectical materialists.
Returning to Lawson, it was suggested above that he does not appear to regard dialectics as
particularly signi￿cant in his version of critical / transcendental realism. In Economics and Reality,
Lawson￿ s ground-breaking book outlining his critique of mainstream economics and his alternative
approach to the subject, he does not once refer explicitly to dialectics (although there are passages
where some version of dialectics or dialectical might be inferred from the context). Certainly he
would not see his work as a whole as being described accurately by the label ￿ dialectical critical
realism￿ . Nevertheless, in some of his later publications reviewed here, there are the occasional
sympathetic references to ￿ dialectics￿and ￿ dialectical￿although he does not explain explicitly the
meanings he ascribes to these terms. However, with the above distinctions and arguments in mind,
we can perhaps infer the way in which Lawson uses these terms and judge how important is the
role played by dialectics in his work.
Lawson does not use these terms in the sense that is most important to dialectical critical realists
in￿ uenced by Marx, as an ontological hypothesis about the structure of social reality (containing
antagonistic contradictions) and its transformation (con￿ ict and the resolution of these contradic-
tions to form a new synthesis). In all his explicit references to dialectics, Lawson uses the term to
mean a form of reasoning. Using Lawson￿ s ontological terminology (see section 3.1) he suggests, for
example, that dialectical reasoning can help in opology and philosophical ontological analysis. In
explaining how opology can clarify a theorist￿ s ontological preconceptions and illuminate the pos-
sible inconsistencies of these with other beliefs held by the theorist, Lawson suggests that: ￿Here,
though, is a yet further (or alternative) way in which social opology can be useful: in revealing such
inconsistencies (and possibly stimulating a dialectical process aimed at reconciling them)￿(Lawson
2004: 21).
As another (and for Lawson more important) example of dialectical reasoning, Lawson explains
how di⁄ering conceptions of a social entity like an institution can be synthesised and made consis-
tent with the conceptual category of emergence arrived at via philosophical ontology and he asserts
that, ￿This synthesising process will typically be dialectical (preserving the insights of all concep-
tions dialectically developed.) In any case, an initial conception will be continually revised to ￿t
with relevant considerations. Put di⁄erently, the process will involve what Strawson calls revision-
ary metaphysics in addition to the initial descriptive metaphysics￿(ibid. 21). Lawson concludes
his thoughts in A Conception of Ontology by saying that insights into the basic social categories
33or entities ￿may actually be best achieved by way of (dialectically) combining philosophical ontol-
ogy and socio-substantive accounts (including lay interpretations) in a programme of revisionary
metaphysics￿(ibid. 23).
In chapter four of his book Reorienting Economics, Lawson explains how his conception of
ontology directs social explanation in certain ways as he then outlines in an alternative explana-
tory method for social science. According to this method, knowledge of and about the social
domain is a transformational dialectical process: ￿And I am rea¢ rming the familiar realist insight
that knowledge, although concerned with an at least partly independent reality or ￿ intransitive￿
object, is a two-way process. Through confronting ￿ objects￿of study we learn not only about
them but simultaneously about ourselves, including, in particular, the errors of our current think-
ing....Knowledge...is intrinsically a transformational process...the knowledge process is funda-
mentally dialectical.￿Defending his reorientation of the explanatory method in the social sciences
along the lines of what he calls ￿ contrast explanation￿he concludes that this ￿is merely an illustra-
tion of the more general insight already noted that, given the open, processual and highly internally
related nature of social reality, we need to be not only analytical in our reasoning, but also, and I
suspect primarily, dialectical￿(Lawson 2003: 101 and 109).
From the above, then, it is clear that Lawson endorses the importance of dialectical rea-
soning in support of the critical realist approach to the social sciences. However, there is little or
no explicit indication in Lawson￿ s work (at least in his publications reviewed here) regarding the
issue of whether social reality itself is a dialectical process in the way critical realists in￿ uenced by
Marxist and radical thought see it. The contradictions and inconsistencies examined by Lawson,
their resolution and synthesis, all belong to the conceptual realm, of reasoning and epistemology
rather than statements about the possibly dialectical nature of social reality. However, there are a
few places where Lawson refers approvingly to certain authors who do endorse the more substan-
tive ontological view of social structures and processes as being inherently dialectical (for example,
see Lawson￿ s 2003: 216, 335fn reference to Wilkinson 1983). Hence it appears that indirectly or
implicitly at least, Lawson may in fact be supportive of this dialectical perspective but he chooses
not to elaborate explicitly in this regard.
The signi￿cance and role of dialectic in M￿ki￿ s work was outlined at the beginning of section 2.
As explained in the introduction thereto, M￿ki describes the general tenor of his varied contributions
as a ￿manifestation of a dialectical approach where philosophical concepts are adjusted and created
in the light of empirical information concerning the actualities of economics￿ (M￿ki 2002: 91).
Like Lawson, M￿ki does not use the term to denote a particular ontological belief about social
reality. Like Lawson, the signi￿cance of dialectic in M￿ki￿ s work is its utility as a mode of reasoning
rather than as an ontological presupposition about the social realm. Also like Lawson, M￿ki￿ s use
of dialectic captures a form of interactive and re￿ exive reasoning between two or more internally
related objects of analysis.
Despite these similarities there are some important di⁄erences in the way Lawson and M￿ki use
the term and its signi￿cance in their work. As noted above, Lawson sees dialectics as useful in
opological studies by revealing inconsistencies between the ontological presuppositions and other
beliefs held by a theorist and possibly helping to reconcile them. A signi￿cant part of M￿ki￿ s work
is dialectical in this sense as in his classic study of Milton Friedman But, as explained above, for
Lawson a more important role for dialectics is in ￿combining philosophical ontology and socio-
substantive accounts (including lay interpretations) in a programme of revisionary metaphysics￿ .
The idea here is that there is a re￿ exive interaction between the ￿ objects￿of study in the social
realm and our knowledge of or about these social entities. As an example of this process (see above),
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to each other and that in this interaction of ideas our knowledge of such entities is continually
adjusted and transformed. Moreover the insights of these di⁄erent conceptions are preserved in
the dialectical process and synthesized to conform to the more general concept of emergence (itself
arrived at via philosophical ontological analysis). This (for Lawson) more important role played
by dialectics is not evident in M￿ki￿ s work. This is because M￿ki does not indulge in philosophical
ontology to speculate about the basic categories of social reality in the way envisioned by Lawson.
In contrast to Lawson, M￿ki is content with the less ambitious dialectical tasks regarding opology
and, more generally, the re￿ exive interaction between the varied outputs of economic theorists and
the conceptual tools of realist philosophy used in this analysis.
In concluding this preliminary evaluation of M￿ki￿ s and Lawson￿ s work it is helpful to return
brie￿ y to the basic di⁄erence in critical content and scope thereof. M￿ki￿ s application of the
tools of analytical philosophy to the subject matter of economics with the more neutral aim of
conceptual and terminological clari￿cation has been (mostly) well-received by the mainstream and
many of his ideas and suggestions, such as the distinction between realism and realisticness in
economic discourse, have been taken on board by the mainstream. Also, because M￿ki defends
a weak version of realism which can accommodate most mainstream and alternative approaches
to economic theory he is less open to criticism than Lawson. Lawson is far more ambitious in
this regard and is thus more open to critical attack. His wide-ranging claims and criticisms of
mainstream economics, especially from the speci￿c transcendental perspective he adopts, have in
turn invited far more critical responses and rejoinders from various quarters. Two selected criticisms
of his work are explained here brie￿ y to give some idea of these responses to his work and to round
o⁄ the discussion.
Lawson￿ s idea of econometrics as the (misguided) search for Humean constant conjunctions is
central to his general critique of mainstream economics and thus a selected criticism of his basic
argument is not out of place here. Hoover (2002) argues that despite the grand claims of the
Cowles Commission the workaday practice of econometricians is far removed from the search for
strict empirical generalisations along the lines of the covering law model of deductive inference.
Hoover argues that econometrics is not incompatible with realism in the sense that it presupposes
the objective existence of underlying causal mechanisms at work in the world that produce the
observed event regularities estimated by regression equations. Unlike the natural sciences, in a social
science like economics such causal mechanisms (or, as Hoover refers to, in Cartwright￿ s terminology
￿ nomological machines￿ ) cannot be isolated and manipulated (￿ engineered￿ ) by experiment in a
laboratory. Because of the nature of its subject, economics must necessarily content itself with
￿ representing￿rather than ￿ intervening￿(see also Hacking 1983). In economics, observation and
estimation of the strength of association between the variables of interest using an econometric
model replace the laboratory experiments of the natural sciences.
Although such regularities are partial and less precise over time and place compared to the
empirical generalisations and laws of the natural sciences, Hoover argues that it is wrong to say
that useful predictions derived from such rough and ready empirical regularities are impossible.
Hoover suggests that econometrics is consistent with ￿ local realism￿ . The relationships estimated
by the regression equations may change over time and place but are nevertheless useful guides to
policymakers and other decision-makers in their speci￿c local context: ￿Robust, but imprecise,
relationships are routinely made more locally precise. This is what Paci￿c Gas and Electric does
when it estimates electricity demand on the basis of temperature, time of day, price, and other
variables. The relationships are well known qualitatively, but its business decisions require more
35quantitatively precise information. They do not regard it as a threat to those decisions if the price
relationship they estimate for California in 1998 is not the same as for California in 1958 or for
Holland in 1998. Academic economists too easily forget that business and government employs
large numbers of their peers in part because of the practical and monetary value that they correctly
assign to their quantitative conclusions￿(Hoover 2002: 161).
Could an estimated empirical regularity as regards, say, electricity demand, temperature, time
of day, price and other such variables possibly count as a ￿ demi-reg￿in Lawson￿ s terms (see section
3.6)? If so then it would appear to undercut Lawson￿ s critique of econometrics ￿at least at the
micro or ￿ local realism￿level suggested by Hoover: ￿Lawson (1997, esp. chapter 14) recognizes the
existence of ￿ demi-regularities￿ , precisely the sort of local, temporally speci￿c regularities that I have
illustrated in the preceding examples. But the existence of demi-regularities sits uneasily with the
uncompromising rejection of econometrics in the earlier parts of his book. Similarly, Lawson (1997,
69) says that he does not question the use of means, growth rates, or other summary statistics which
are legitimate where feasible. A substantial part of my argument...is that much of econometrics is in
fact more sophisticated versions of these ￿ legitimate￿activities and investigation into the conditions
of their ￿ feasibility￿ . One strategy open to Lawson would be to de￿ne econometrics as the search
for constant conjunctions so that it necessarily fails if there are no such constant conjunctions; but
this would do little justice to the reality of econometrics as it is practiced￿(Hoover 2002: 161).
Whether one is persuaded by Lawson￿ s account depends very much on accepting his portrayal
of mainstream economics as a misguided failure. In concluding his review of Lawson￿ s 1997 book,
Alan Nelson argues that such considerations lead us inevitably to ￿be drawn again into the morass
of evaluating the success of the mainstream and the orthodox. The mainstream is rarely prepared
to acknowledge any undue degree of disarray. And surely the mainstream would explain its own
persistence by appeal to its success, utility and (when waxing methodological) by appeal to its
closeness to the truth. It would seem that the mainstream economist and the economist inspired
by Transcendental Realism are once more reduced to simply gainsaying each other on this point.
Those who come to Lawson￿ s book already deeply disa⁄ected with the mainstream might be glad to
learn of a methodological ￿ -ism￿to counter any mainstream claim to superior methodology. Those
who come to this book well satis￿ed with orthodoxy will not ￿nd much to undercut their practice￿
(Nelson 2003: 423￿ 424). Despite the elaboration and re￿nement of Lawson￿ s arguments and his
carefully considered responses to critics and misunderstandings of his earlier book, it does not seem
that his later work (such as his book Reorienting Economics) has, thus far, done that much to
change Nelson￿ s basic conclusion in this regard. Of course, Lawson might argue that it is hardly
his intention to persuade die-hard adherents of the mainstream and that his e⁄orts are primarily
directed to a younger generation of economists more open to alternative ideas in this respect.
Lawson￿ s attitude seems to be one of ￿ Old soldiers never die, they just fade away.￿However, at this
stage, notwithstanding Lawson￿ s inventive critique, the extent to which the mainstream is indeed
fading and unable to rejuvenate or reinvent itself is debatable.
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